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Abstract
Past decades have seen ever more devices connected to the Internet and new net-
worked services created. Demands for networks—whether campus or enterprise net-
works that support most of our daily work activities or data center networks that power
today’s cloud services such as web, social media, music or video streaming services—
have seen rapid growth. Managing and securing these networks with growing size and
complexity have become a daunting task, as today’s networks are primarily “manually”
managed by network operators. This task is further compounded by lack of effective
tools for network configurations and monitoring systems to provide visibility as to what is
going on inside a network. This thesis studies existing network management approaches
and identifies their limitations. We develop new network management frameworks—in
particular, leveraging emerging networking technologies—to assist network operators
and users in better managing and securing networks. We specifically focus on three
key management tasks: diagnosing security policy misconfigurations, enhancing routing
flexibility, and gaining on-demand flow visibility for better network control.
First, we study security group (i.e., the primary means for cloud customers to con-
figure security policies to protect their virtual machine instances from attacks) configu-
rations and usage by customers in a public cloud platform based on real-world datasets.
Motivated by the results and insights obtained from this measurement study, we develop
a cloud security group analysis system which helps cloud customers diagnose potential
misconfigurations and provides suggestions to refine security group configurations.
Second, we propose a novel framework for incremental and graceful transition from
legacy networks to Software-Defined Networking (SDN) networks in stages by gradu-
ally replacing legacy devices with SDN-enabled devices as needed and as budgets allow.
Hence, network operators can gracefully experiment with SDN networks to gain expe-
rience and build confidence while eliminating or minimizing service disruption. More
importantly, operators can enjoy the benefits as fully deployed SDN networks. We de-
velop a novel unified network management controller that exerts SDN-like, fine-grained
routing control over both SDN-enabled and legacy switches in hybrid networks.
iv
Third, with the goal of obtaining on-demand visibility as to monitor “who is talking
to whom”, we propose clairvoyant networks to provide visibility for any network flow
at any time with low cost. Clairvoyant networks are partially programmable—they
require as few as one SDN switch—and rely on a specialized network controller that
controls paths through both the SDN and legacy networks. Our proposed clairvoyant
controller allows operators to define what to see, where to see, and how to see; then
enables/disables the specified flows’ visibility in a task scheduler, within milliseconds.
In summary, this thesis studies the management of enterprise and data center net-
works. Our developed systems are capable of: i) helping operators and users understand
and diagnose security policy configurations; ii) providing unified routing control to en-
able incremental and graceful transition from legacy networks to SDN networks; and
iii) gaining on-demand network visibility for better network control.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With ever more devices connected to the Internet and new services created, demands
for networks—whether campus or enterprise networks that support most of our daily
work activities or data center networks that power today’s cloud services such as web,
email, social media, music or video streaming services—have seen rapid growth. It is
reported that Google’s current data center has more than 100 times the capacity of
its first generation of data center [1]. Undoubtedly, network management complexity
is also dramatically increasing [2]. According to a Avaya survey [3], 94% of European
businesses are negatively affected by the complexities of their networks. Managing these
networks typically needs a huge group of operators to perform daily management tasks
such as registering new devices, configuring routing policies, setting up firewall rules,
and maintaining efficient network utilization as well as reliable network availability. It
is reported in a recent survey [4] that 69% of networking professionals rely on manual
processes, and 97% of networking professionals experienced network outages as a direct
result of human error.
With the goal of enhancing the network management in enterprises and data-centers,
this thesis designs and develops new network management systems that enhance access
control, routing, visibility, and controllability in enterprise and data center networks.
The key challenges are the large number of hosts, switches, and applications in these
networks and the need for dynamic policies, flexible routing paths, and real-time visibil-
ity. To address these challenges, we propose three key ideas: i) designing a configuration
diagnosis system to help cloud tenants visualize and refine security policy settings; ii)
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2providing flexible and unified path control in enterprise networks by leveraging emerging
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm through incremental and strategical de-
ployment of programmable devices; iii) gaining on-demand network visibility for better
network control.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The central thesis of this dissertation is as follows:
Today’s network management, relying on extensive manual processes and low-level
configurations, introduces high complexity and little manageability.
This thesis develops new tools and systems—in particular, leveraging emerging net-
working technologies—to assist network operators and users in better managing and
securing networks. We specifically focus on three key management tasks: diagnosing
security policy misconfigurations, enhancing routing flexibility, and gaining on-demand
network visibility for better network control.
1.2 Outline and Contributions
This dissertation studies network management in security policy configuration, routing,
and monitoring separately. The outline of this dissertation, along with the primary
contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
Understanding Security Group Usage in a Public IaaS Cloud (Chap-
ter 3). In this chapter, we investigate and understand how cloud tenants configure
security groups and assist them in designing better security groups. We first conduct a
measurement-oriented analysis of security group configuration and usage by tenants in
a public IaaS cloud based on real-world datasets. The goal is to understand what are
the usage patterns (“good” and “bad” practices) in how cloud tenants configure their
security groups. Motivated by the results and insights obtained from this measurement
study, we propose and develop a cloud security group analysis system called Socrates,
which employs visual analytics to assist cloud tenants in understanding the static and
dynamic access relations among VM instances. Socrates also helps diagnose potential
misconfigurations and provides suggestions to refine security group configurations based
3on observed traffic traversing tenants’ VMs. By applying Socrates to all existing tenants
hosted on the public IaaS cloud, Our results reveal that more than 80% tenants do not
have security groups configured properly, which can lead to security vulnerabilities. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to analyze cloud security group usage
based on real-world datasets, and to develop a system to help cloud tenants understand,
diagnose and better refine their security group configurations.
Unified Fine-Grained Path Control in Legacy and SDN Hybrid Networks
(Chapter 4). In this chapter, we argue that it is possible to achieve most of the ben-
efits of a fully deployed SDN at a fraction of the cost by strategically replacing only
few legacy switches with—or introducing a few—new SDN-enabled switches in a legacy
network, thus creating a hybrid network. Hence, network operators can gracefully ex-
periment with SDN networks to gain experience and build confidence while eliminating
or minimizing service disruption. More importantly, operators can enjoy much of the
benefits as fully deployed SDN networks. We design and build Magneto, a unified net-
work controller that exerts SDN-like, fine-grained path control over both SDN-enabled
and legacy switches in hybrid networks. Magneto i) introduces magnet MAC addresses
and dynamically updates IP-to-magnet MAC mappings at hosts via gratuitous ARP
messages for visibility and routing control; and ii) uses the ability of SDN switches to
send “custom” packets into the data plane to manipulate legacy switches into updating
forwarding entries with magnet MAC addresses for enhanced routing flexibility. Our
evaluation on a lab testbed and through extensive simulations on large enterprise net-
work topologies show that Magneto is able to achieve full control over routing when only
20% of network switches are programmable, with negligible computation and latency
overhead.
Gaining Fine-Grained Network Visibility for On-Demand Monitoring and
Better Policy Enforcement (Chapter 5). In this chapter, we are exploring beyond
the unified fine-grained path control. Our goal is to obtain fine-grained network visibility
as to monitor “who is talking to whom”, “how much traffic is being sent to a destination,
say Google”. We propose clairvoyant networks to provide visibility for any flow at any
time and with low cost. Clairvoyant networks are partially programmable—they require
as few as one SDN switch—and rely on a specialized network controller that controls
paths through both the SDN and legacy networks. The clairvoyant controller allows
4operators to define what to see, where to see, and how to see; then enables/disables the
specified flows’ visibility in a task scheduler, within milliseconds. Our evaluation on a lab
testbed and through extensive simulations on large enterprise network topologies show
that, even with a single SDN-enabled switch, operators can make any flow visible for
monitoring within milliseconds, albeit at 38% average increase in path length. With as
many as 2% strategically chosen legacy switches replaced with SDN switches, clairvoyant
networks achieve on-demand flow visibility with negligible overhead.
This thesis studies and designs management systems for enterprise and data center
networks. Our proposed systems are capable of: i) helping operators and users under-
stand and refine security policy configurations; ii) enhancing routing flexibility so as
to increase network utilization and efficiency; and iii) gaining network visibility to for
better policy control and fine-grained network monitoring.
The remainder of this dissertation introduces background and motivation (Chap-
ter 2); presents the security group usage in a public IaaS cloud and our cloud security
group analysis system (Chapter 3); presents our designed unified network controller
that exerts SDN-like, fine-grained path control in hybrid SDN networks (Chapter 4);
presents clairvoyant networks to provide visibility for any network flow at any time and
with low cost (Chapter 5); discusses future directions and finally concludes (Chapter 6).
1.3 Bibliographic Notes
Part of the contents of Chapter 3 on studying security group usage and designing our
cloud security group analysis system is from a conference paper, titled “Understanding
Security Group Usage in a Public IaaS Cloud”, which appeared in the Proceedings of the
35th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), San Francisco, CA,
USA, April 10-14, 2016 [5]. Our developed unified network controller that exerts SDN-
like, fine-grained path control in hybrid SDN networks is presented in a conference paper
titled“Magneto: Unified Fine-grained Path Control in Legacy and OpenFlow Hybrid
Networks”, which appeared in the Proceedings of ACM Sigcomm Symposium on SDN
Research (SOSR), Santa Clara, CA, USA, April 03 - 04, 2017 [6]. This constitutes
Chapter 4. Part of Chapter 5 is from a paper titled “Clairvoyant Networks”, which is
currently under review in a conference in the networking area.
Chapter 2
Background and Motivation
Enterprise networks (e.g., the networks in campuses and corporations) and data-center
networks (e.g., the network infrastructures hosting cloud services) play a critical role
in modern society, since most users, devices and applications reside in these networks.
With emerging techniques such as the Internet of Things, virtual and augmented reality,
more devices are connected to these networks everyday. It is reported that the number
of devices connected to the Internet will be three times as high as the global population
in 2020 [7]. The global data center traffic will grow 3-fold from 2015 to 2020 [8], and the
global enterprise networking market is expected to reach USD 64.63 billion by 2024 [9].
Judicious network management facilitates a healthy and sustainable network. Managing
these networks to provide secure and reliable network services with high availability and
performance is a central problem for computer networking research.
2.1 Today’s Network Management
Network devices started from parcels of protocols. The control plane (i.e., learning and
building the routes in a network) and the data plane (i.e., forwarding packets based
on the decision made by the control plane) reside in a same network device, as shown
in Figure 2.1. Managing a network generally works as: logging into the devices and
running vendor-specific commands to set up configurations and tune protocol behaviors.
Management tools are developed based on operators’ experience and customized to
specific cases—they are vendor-dependent, low-level, and inextensible.
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Figure 2.1: Today’s network management.
2.1.1 Management Tasks
Network management in enterprises and data centers involves numerous tasks such as
registering new devices (e.g., servers, switches, and routers), setting up security policies,
configuring routing policies, as well as obtaining network visibility to enable monitoring,
measurement and trouble-shooting. This thesis focuses on security policy configuration,
routing and monitoring.
Security policy configuration: Security policy rules are configured to restrict
the traffic from/to certain source/destination hosts, in order to guarantee the network
and system security. For example, in an enterprise network, traffic between unrelated
teams and departments is isolated. In a multi-tenant data center, a tenant should not
have access to other tenants’ virtual machines (VMs) without permission granted. In
addition, in each tenant, VMs should have different permissions to access resources
based on their roles (e.g., a public front-end web server shall not have open access to
database servers). These security policies are typically fine-grained and involves low-
level configurations.
Routing: A typical enterprise network is comprised of (legacy) Ethernet switches
with VLAN capabilities. Standard layer 2 Ethernet switches perform two main func-
tions: learning (the next-hop switch towards a destination MAC address) and forwarding
(a packet according to learned information). To learn the next-hop switch for a packet,
layer 2 switches broadcast the packet on all ports except the one on which the packet
arrived. To prevent loops they restrict the underlying topology to a spanning tree by
7turning off (e.g., using the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)) or aggregating (e.g., using
link aggregation) multiple links. In other words, ports associated with “off-tree” links
are de-activated or blocked. The path of a packet is static and changes only if there are
topology or configuration changes in the network. To increase path diversity, operators
can slice the network into multiple VLANs, each with its own spanning tree and set of
forwarding entries.
Monitoring: Operators need to monitor the network traffic for various purposes
such as accounting, anomaly detection, troubleshooting, and traffic engineering. For
example, operators in data centers may need to identify the large flows in the network to
better configure their routing for traffic engineering (i.e., a flow is a sequence of packets
that share the same packet header properties such as source address/port, destination
address/port, and/or protocol). In addition, having the visibility of network can help
track network events and topological information.
2.1.2 Limitations of Existing Network Management
Coupled control plane and data plane: As shown in Figure 2.1, the control plane
is coupled with the data plane. The control plane on each device exchanges information
with other devices in the network, and then computes its routing/forwarding table.
The data plane forwards packets based on the tables built by the control plane. Each
device only has a partial (local) view of a network, so that it cannot make network-wide
decisions and it is slow to recover from failures.
Vendor-specific and low-level configurations: Network devices are sold as
monolithic boxes with the coupled control plane and data plane, and the configuration
interface varies from vendor to vendor. No change on the control-plane or data-plane
can be easily made since these boxes are closed and proprietary. In this case, network
management eventually becomes configuring the control plane with the given vendor
APIs. As a result, operators have to master low-level details to be able to tune protocol
behaviors correctly.
Error-prone manual process: Manual configuration has been widely-used in
network management and proved to be error-prone [4]. Dependency in different network
elements and the increasing scale make it a Herculean task to manage a network without
a good automated system. For example, just to bring a server online in a campus
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Figure 2.2: Network management with software-defined solutions.
network, operators need to add a new entry in the DHCP server, configure VLANs
correctly, set up firewall rules, and make sure no blocking configuration exists in switches
or routers.
2.2 Rethinking Network Management with Software-Defined
Solutions
2.2.1 Software-Defined Networking
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] decouples the control plane
from the data plane, as shown in Figure 2.2. With a (logically) centralized control
plane [15, 16] and a programmatic match-action data plane abstraction [17, 18, 19], SDN
enables flexible, fine-grained network control and monitoring, and offers the potential to
transform network management: from today’s largely manual process to an automated
process governed by (high-level) network policies. The control plane (i.e., controller,
a.k.a., network OS) decides the behaviors of data-plane switches by installing match-
action rules using a standard protocol (e.g., OpenFlow). The match determines which
headers in the packet to match and their values, and the action(s) determines a sequence
of actions to perform on the matched packets. For example, forwarding the packets
destined to a server Alice to port 2 can be defined with “destination MAC address =
Alice’s MAC address” in the match field and “output to port 2” in the action field.
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view of a network in order to make good network-wide decisions. The interface between
control plane and data plane is open and vendor-agnostic, so different controllers can be
developed to serve diverse network set-ups. Management tasks can also be implemented
as software applications running upon the control plane, so that automating manage-
ment tasks with defining high-level intent is not mission impossible any more. SDN
made a grand opening in providing software-defined solutions to network management.
Taking this inspiration, we can explore how to manage network judiciously.
2.2.2 Security Policy Configuration in IaaS Clouds
Cloud computing enables ubiquitous access to a shared pool of computing, network,
and storage resources. It provides users with convenient and on-demand capabilities to
store, process, and retrieve data in data centers. In Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
cloud computing platform such as Amazon EC2 and OpenStack, cloud customers can
even outsource the physical and virtual resources to develop their own applications.
Nonetheless, security is one of the main concerns in the adoption of cloud computing.
As an example, the data breach at Target resulted in the loss of personal and credit
card information of up to 110 million individuals [20]. To this end, researchers have
developed many security solutions to be offered as a cloud service. For instance, virtual
machine introspection as a cloud service is offered to allow customers to develop their
own tamper-resistant security tools without relying on cloud providers.
In IaaS cloud platforms, security group is the primary means for cloud tenants to
configure security policies to protect their virtual machine (VM) instances against at-
tacks. A security group is a (named) container for a set of security rules. It provides
tenants the ability to specify the type and direction of traffic allowed by VM instances.
Unlike the conventional network firewalls where rules are typically configured by ex-
perienced network administrators, security groups and their constituent security rules
are specified by cloud tenants, some of whom may lack an adequate network manage-
ment background to properly configure security groups. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities
in one tenants VMs pose security threats not only to the tenant itself but also to the
entire cloud platform. Ensuring that each cloud tenant properly specifies his/her secu-
rity groups and the rules therein is therefore paramount to cloud platform providers.
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In Chapter 3, we present a tool that helps operators and users understand and refine
security group configurations.
2.2.3 Unified Fine-Grained Routing Control with Incremental SDN
Deployment
Today’s networks are maintained by “masters of complexity”: network operators, who
have accumulated tremendous experience, devote significant efforts to operate highly-
available networks and troubleshoot complex problems. The reason behind is that legacy
networks lack global visibility and proper abstraction which can enable centralized con-
trol. SDN provides a logically-centralized interface to control and interact with network
devices. Operators perform network management tasks through software programs ex-
ecuted from a logically centralized controller. The flexible control and global visibility
offered by SDN can reduce the cost of operating a network by half [21]. However, fully
benefiting from SDN requires a considerable initial investment: network providers must
upgrade or replace existing legacy switches with SDN-enabled switches (e.g., whose
forwarding behaviors are programmable remotely from a logically-centralized controller
using a specialized protocol such as OpenFlow [17]).
Recent work, both in academia and industry, attempts to reduce the capital ex-
penditure of SDN while maintaining most of its benefits, by upgrading only a few,
strategically chosen legacy switches in a network. We refer to such networks as hybrid
SDN networks. Although effective at controlling routing paths through SDN-enabled
devices, the control points are also limited to the SDN-enabled devices. None of the
previous work can dynamically affect the forwarding behaviors of the remaining legacy
devices and, consequently, the paths through the legacy sub-network. To control those
paths in the legacy sub-network, manual configurations or additional protocols need to
be further applied. In Chapter 4, we present a system that enhances routing flexibility
so as to increase network utilization and efficiency.
11
2.2.4 On-demand Network Visibility for Better Monitoring and Policy
Enforcement
Real-time monitoring of all network flows is critical for preserving network health and
detecting operational problems in enterprises. To make flows visible, network operators
deploy monitoring tools (e.g., NetFlow, SNMP [22, 23, 24]) pervasively throughout the
network to cover flow paths or mirror packets to dedicated appliances. For example,
to identify large flows, NetFlow-enabled switches sample packets and build flow-level
packet counters. Monitoring tools must be strategically deployed across the data plane
to enable network-wide visibility, and carefully tuned to avoid overloading the data
plane [25].
Another approach is to jointly optimize routing and monitoring tasks such that flows
traverse specific monitoring devices [26, 27, 28]. This requires a fully-programmable data
plane (e.g., SDN-enabled switches) which may not be readily available and is expensive
to deploy. In Chapter 5, we present a system that gains on-demand network visibility
by making a network partially programmable.
Chapter 3
Understanding Security Group
Usage in a Public IaaS Cloud
3.1 Introduction
In Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud platforms such as Amazon EC2 and Open-
stack [29, 30], security group is the primary means for cloud tenants to configure security
policies to protect their virtual machine (VM) instances against attacks [31, 32]. Al-
though similar to the conventional network firewalls in many ways, security groups
have several distinct features that make their configuration somewhat more complex
and trickier to use. Unlike firewalls where rules are typically configured by experienced
network administrators, security groups and their constituent security rules must be
specified by cloud tenants, some of whom may not be well-trained or lack an adequate
network management background to properly configure security groups. Unfortunately,
vulnerabilities in one tenant’s VMs pose security threats not only to the tenant itself
but also to the entire multi-tenant cloud platform. Ensuring that each cloud tenant
properly specifies his/her security groups and the rules therein is therefore paramount
to multi-tenant cloud platform providers.
In this chapter we first conduct a measurement-oriented analysis of security group
configuration and usage by tenants in an IaaS cloud based on real-world datasets. Our
goal of this measurement study is multi-fold: to understand what are the usage patterns
(“good” and “bad” practices) in how cloud tenants configure their security groups, what
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they attempt to achieve, what are the common issues and potential security vulnerabil-
ities, and how to help cloud tenants refine their security group configurations to prevent
these issues and vulnerabilities. As an example of “bad” practices and potential vul-
nerabilities revealed by our analysis of a multi-tenant IaaS cloud system security group
dataset, we find that a number of tenants simply allow all traffic (0.0.0.0/0) from
both the external Internet and within the cloud to access their VMs. In general many
tenants inappropriately configure their security groups by using loose, and sometimes
inconsistent, rules (see § 3.2 and §3.5 for more discussion on these and related points).
Motivated by the results and insights obtained from this measurement study, we
propose and develop a cloud security group analysis tool called Socrates. Socrates takes
the security group settings of each tenant, the VM mapping as well as the observed
traffic flows (both allowed and denied) as inputs, and employs visual analytics to assist
cloud tenants in understanding the static and dynamic access relations among VMs
based on the security groups they have specified and the traffic observed. Furthermore,
our tool also helps cloud tenants diagnose potential misconfigurations and provides
suggestions to refine security group configurations based on real traffic traversing the
tenant VMs. As a result, cloud tenants can view their security group configurations
in a high-level, visualized manner, and revise their security group settings immediately
after they realize some configurations do not meet their intent.
By applying Socrates to all existing tenants hosted on our IaaS cloud using the
week-long datasets, we report some key results and lessons we have learned in §3.5.
As alluded earlier, security groups are often set up by tenants who are “ordinary”
application developers and may not be experts in network security. Hence we expect to
see many configuration errors. Nonetheless we are surprised to find many configuration
issues, some of which can lead to potential security vulnerabilities. For example, we find
that more than 80% tenants configure security groups in a loose manner. In contrast,
some tenants verbosely set rules leading to giant security groups with hundreds of rules.
While many tenants create multiple security groups for their VMs, a large number
of them do not have a clearly defined structure in mind when creating these security
groups. Socrates also reveals many redundant or inconsistent rules in the security group
configurations, likely the result of tenants’ lack of knowledge about the intricacies of
security groups (e.g., rule ordering is immaterial) or mistakes in configuring rules. To
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the best of our knowledge, this is the first work of analyzing cloud security groups. Our
work sheds light on understanding the common usage for security groups and proposes
a tool to better understand, diagnose and refine security group configurations.
3.2 Overview and Datasets
In this section, we first describe the basic concepts of IaaS cloud security groups and
then the datasets used in our study.
IaaS Cloud: VMs and Security Groups. Creating a cloud application in an IaaS
cloud starts with launching VM instances. One critical step in launching a VM is to
configure security groups. A security group is a container for a set of security group
rules. It provides tenants the ability to specify the type and direction of traffic allowed
by VMs. Security groups are applied to individual VMs, whose private IP addresses are
dynamically assigned only at the time they are launched – in other words, such private
IP addresses are, in general, unbeknownst to the tenant at the time he/she specifies the
security group rules. Unlike conventional firewall rules, the default action of security
group rules is deny; thus, a tenant needs to explicitly specify what type of traffic (in
terms of protocol and port) and from where (e.g., in the form of a public or private
IP address prefix) can access his/her instances. Furthermore, security groups can be
“nested” in the sense that the security group rules in one security group, say, SG-A, can
use the name of another security group (either belonging to the same tenant or another
tenant), say, SG-B – in lieu of a (public or private) IP address prefix – to explicitly
specify that the traffic from VMs in SG-B can access VMs in SG-A on ports permitted
by the security group rules. Furthermore, the ordering of rules within a security group
is immaterial; security group rules are not prioritized as in the case of firewall rules.
Therefore, the most permissive rule gets applied if more than one rule is created for
a specific port or IP range. Table 3.1 shows an example of a security group. Due
to nested security group rules or IP ranges’ coverage on VMs, there are dependencies
among various security groups defined by one tenant (and sometimes among multiple
tenants). Ideally, a tenant should create security groups based on the roles of VMs in a
cloud service he/she develops.
Before getting launched, each VM must be assigned with at least one security group.
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Table 3.1: An example of security group with 3 rules.
Action Protocol Port Range IP Range
ALLOW TCP 80 – 5666 10.0.10.0/24
ALLOW UDP 68 – 68 SG-A
ALLOW ICMP 8,0 11.22.33.44/32
A default security group is defined for all tenants, which by default denies all ingress
traffic and allows all egress traffic and the traffic among the VMs associated with the
default security group. When a VM is launched, it is associated with the default security
group if no security group is specified by the tenant. In addition, a tenant can define
and customize new security groups. One VM can be associated with multiple security
groups, and one security group can be assigned to a collect of VMs. Therefore, one
tenant can have a set of security groups and VMs, and the mapping between them can
be fairly complex. Finally, tenants can configure security groups by adding or deleting
rules, but not modifying an existing rule (A rule cannot be modified once it is created).
Changes are automatically applied to the running VMs associated with the security
group.
Datasets. The datasets used in our study are collected from a single multi-tenant
data center running the OpenStack cloud software. There are three types of datasets:
the secgroup dataset, the VM-layout dataset and the sFlow dataset. The first type
of dataset is called secgroup which contains security groups and the constituent rules
defined by cloud tenants. It contains five main fields: tenant ID, security group name,
protocol type (TCP, UDP, or ICMP), port range (or ICMP type and code), and the
source (IP range in the CIDR notation or the name of a security group). A tenant ID
allows us to match the tenant across multiple datasets. The second type of dataset is
the VM-layout that stores information about running VMs in the cloud at any given
time. The important fields are VM name, tenant ID, associated security group(s),
public IP address (if assigned), and private IP address. Both the security group and
VM layout datasets are collected from the cloud configuration database. The last type
of dataset is sFlow that contains flow traces (both allowed and denied flows) collected
at each switch by random sampling. It stores packet header information, including
source and destination IP addresses, TCP/UDP port numbers, time, switch identifier,
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Figure 3.1: Basic statistics of security group usage by tenants.
and source/destination switch ports associated with the packet.
3.3 Current Usage of Security Groups
As security group is still a relatively unknown concept to many IaaS cloud customers, we
first conduct an extensive measurement-based analysis of security group configuration
and usage by tenants in an IaaS cloud based on real-world datasets. In the following,
we present some basic statistics and a few key results from this measurement-based
analysis of the multi-tenant IaaS cloud security group, VM and flow datasets. The goal
is to identify the common usage patterns in how cloud tenants generally configure their
security groups. We also briefly point out a few “bad” practices in cloud tenant security
group configurations, which we will expand on further in Section 3.5 in conjunction with
the discussion of the results obtained from applying our Socrates tool.
3.3.1 Basic Statistics
Fig. 3.1a shows the number of security groups and the number of VMs in each tenant, as
well as the number of rules that each security group has. The x -axis is the normalized
value where n is a base value. As the results show, around 10% tenants have only
one security group, and the remaining have at least two security groups. Most tenants
have less than several dozen security groups, whereas not every security group plays a
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and rules.
different role. The number of rules in security groups (log value) starts with −1 (it could
be any negative value, and we use −1 for simplicity) at x -axis, because some tenants
have empty security groups that do not have any rule. Apart from 15% no-rule security
groups, most security groups have less than one hundred rules.
Given the tenants that have multiple security groups and multiple VMs, we are
interested in the association between security groups and VMs (shown in Fig. 3.1b). Our
results show 50% security groups are associated with only one VM. In the remaining
half of security groups, most of them are associated with a few dozen VMs, and very
few of them are associated with a very large number of VMs. 70% VMs are assigned
with only one security group, and others are assigned with multiple security groups.
As depicted in Fig 3.2a, generally the more VMs a tenant has, the more security
groups it tends to have, so the more sophisticated system the tenant is expected to
build. However, we also notice that some tenants have a large number of VMs but only
contain a few number of security groups. One reason is that these tenants have simple
architectures but very high workload so that they need to launch a number of VMs to
balance the workload. Another possible reason is that the tenants glue all rules in a
few security groups instead of reasonably separating them into more security groups
(discussed in Section 3.5).
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3.3.2 Rules in Security Groups
To investigate how security groups are configured in tenants, we start from studying
their rules. Each rule consists of port and IP range. Based on the IP range, a rule
can be classified into three groups: only accepting the external traffic1, only accepting
the internal traffic, accepting both external and internal traffic (e.g., 0.0.0.0/0). As a
security group is a set of rules, we can further determine whether a security group is:
accepting only the external traffic, accepting only the internal traffic, or both. In our
secgroup dataset, we find that 42% rules allow external traffic (referred to as external
rules) and they are distributed in 34% security groups. 39% rules allow internal traffic
and they are distributed in 61% security groups (referred to as internal rules). 19%
rules allow traffic from everywhere (0.0.0.0/0) and they are distributed in 50% security
groups (also referred to as external rules). In addition, a rule can be very restrictive or
very permissive by setting the decimal in CIDR notation. For example, decimal 32 is
used to specify an individual IP address, and decimal 0 means cover all IP addresses.
We find that 34% rules use decimal 32 (e.g., a.b.c.d/32). Around 60% external rules
use decimal 32 to set individual IP addresses, while most internal rules use IP blocks
(i.e., 0 < decimal < 32).
In terms of the port range used by each rule, our results show that the top five
mostly-used TCP port ranges are 80, 443, 8080, 22, and 1-65535. We are surprised to
see many rules use 1-65535 in port range, because simply allowing all ports is very risky.
Moreover, ICMP rules’ configurations are more biased, more than 90% ICMP rules are
coarsely set to allow all types and all codes.
Furthermore, we also observe that 14% security groups distributed in 48% tenants
contain redundant or inconsistent rules: for instance, two rules allow traffic on the same
port (say, TCP 443) but from two different IP address prefixes, one a sub-prefix of the
other. Such rules make little sense, as traffic will be allowed by the less restrictive rule.
This appears to be a result of a tenant attempting to modify an existing rule by adding
a new rule but forgetting to delete the old rule. Fig. 3.2c shows the number of rules
and the number of redundant rules each security group has.
1We define external IPs as the addresses that do not belong to the IaaS cloud. In contrast, internal
IPs are owned by the cloud. For simplicity, external traffic is referred to as the traffic between internal
IPs and external IPs, and internal traffic denotes traffic between internal IPs.
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3.3.3 Security Group Dependency
Based on the understanding of rule settings and the fact that a security group is actually
a set of rules, now we study the security group usage at the tenant level. As a rule
can be categorized into external rules and internal rules, a security group can also be
categorized into external (only has external rules), internal (only has internal rules),
and mixed (has both external and internal rules).
In our dataset, all tenants allow external traffic to some extent. 15% tenants consist
of only external security groups. The security group rules for external traffic should be
more carefully configured in order to protect the VMs from outside attacks. As most
tenants have multiple security groups, we are interested in the relationship among the
security groups in the same tenant. The relation can be depicted as a graph (discussed
in details in Section 3.4), where each security group is a node and each directed edge
indicates that the successor allows certain type of traffic from the predecessor. 70%
security group graphs have bidirectional edges between each pair of security groups.
Among them, around 40% share same port ranges on the same pair of bidirectional
edges.
3.3.4 Bad Practice in Security Group Configurations
As part of the motivation for the Socrates tool, we provide some sample results from an
initial analysis of the secgroup dataset (see Table 3.2). Our analysis shows that “good
practice” (i.e., use nested security groups to scope communications among VMs) is not
widely adopted yet – only 5% tenants employ nested security group rules. It reveals
a fact that many cloud tenants have not completely grasped the concept of security
groups or the subtle intricacies involved, and as a result, often specify rules that are
either semantically incorrect or too loose.
We find that 24% tenants open all ports on their VMs to accept traffic. Out of these
tenants, 19% tenants allow traffic from 0.0.0.0/0, i.e., accept traffic from anywhere
on the Internet. This extremely-permissive setting exposes the tenants as victims of
potential security attacks because it does not filter any traffic. When looking into the
IP ranges specified in the rules, we find that some tenants do not even understand
the CIDR notation. 13% tenants in our dataset have rules with a.b.c.d/0 (where
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a.b.c.d != 0.0.0.0) and 5% have rules with 0.0.0.0/x (where x!= 0), which is semantically
incorrect. In addition, many tenants often use rules with 10.0.0.0/8 instead of nested
security groups when their intention is to simply enable communications among VMs
between certain security groups (see Section 3.5 for more detail).
Table 3.2: Initial analysis of secgroup dataset.
Usage Tenants Rules
Bad usage 24% Open all ports (1–65535)
Bad usage 13% Meaningless CIDR: a.b.c.d/0 (a.b.c.d !=
0.0.0.0)
Bad usage 5% Meaningless CIDR: 0.0.0.0/x (x!=0)
Good usage 5% Use nested security groups
In some tenants’ configurations, all of their security groups surprisingly open all
ports for all VMs belonging to the tenants. This loose setting arouse our investigation in
their flow usage. We find that their flows are much more restrictive (i.e., only contacting
some ports from a subset of VMs) compared to the configured rules. These observations
motivated us to design and develop a tool which visualizes the security group setting,
analyzes real flows against the security group rules, and generates diagnostic reports,
which detailing problems with the security group rules. Section 3.4 explains the design
of our tool Socrates.
3.4 Socrates: A Security Group Analysis Tool
In this section we provide an overview of Socrates – a cloud security group analysis
tool that we have developed 2 – and briefly describe its key components. Part of the
rationale for Socrates is our recognition that many IaaS cloud tenants are “ordinary”
application developers who may not be very familiar with notion of security group and
its intricacies, let alone being a network security expert. Ideally, when a tenant develops
and deploys a service or application on an IaaS cloud platform, security groups should
be created to reflect the roles of VMs and meet their security and management require-
ments. As we briefly discussed in Section 3.3 and further expanded on in Section 3.5,
2The name, Socrates, is derived as an anagram of the capitalized letters in SECurity gROup AnalySis
Tool.
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creating and configuring security groups can be quite a challenging task for many ten-
ants. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities in one tenant’s VMs pose security threats not only
to other tenants but also to the entire multi-tenant cloud platform. Hence ensuring
security for each tenant is crucial.
Socrates is designed to assist cloud tenants in understanding their security group
settings and help them diagnose their configuration issues. Socrates takes the security
group settings of each tenant, the VM mapping as well as the observed traffic flows
(both allowed and denied) as inputs, and produces a visual representation of security
group/VM structure as well as a diagnosis and recommendation report to help tenants
diagnose and improve their security group configurations based on observed network
traffic. Socrates consists of three key components: visualizer, flow analyzer, and recom-
mender, see Fig. 3.3 for a schematic illustration.
Security Group/VM Structure Visualizer: It displays the dependencies of security
groups and VMs through directed graph representations based on the (static) security
group settings and the (dynamic) VMs to security group mappings. The dependency
between security groups reveals the cloud service infrastructure design that a customer
has envisioned. Hence, a directed graph (referred to as a security group structure graph)
is generated to represent security groups of one tenant, where nodes stand for individ-
ual security groups and the edges encode dependencies between security groups. Each
directed edge indicates the successor security group allows the traffic satisfying the spe-
cific port range and IP range from the predecessor security group (or external networks).
From the graph, we further identify tiers to which security groups belong. A security
group is defined as tier N if and only if it allows traffic from tier N−1 but not from any
other lower tiers. For example, tier 1 security groups contain at least one rule explicitly
allowing external traffic. Tier 2 security groups allow traffic from tier 1 security groups
but not from external networks. After building the security group structure graph, we
next add the VM-level structure into the graph by mapping VMs to assigned secu-
rity groups. VMs are displayed as rectangular nodes inside the corresponding security
groups. In addition, we introduce edges between VMs within the same security group
to indicate that traffic is allowed between a particular pair of VMs. On the other hand,
the dependency between VMs across two security groups are already captured by edges
between security groups. Fig. 3.4a depicts the security group/VM structure for a real
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tenant from our datasets, nicknamed “Alice”, where all security groups belong to tier 1
since they all allow external traffic.
Flow Analyzer: It infers the cloud service infrastructure design by analyzing the
traffic flows associated with the service, both allowed and blocked. A particular flow
between a source VM and a destination VM is considered allowed or blocked based on
whether it is allowed by rules in the destination VM security group or not. To build
the flow structure, the analyzer marks flows as either allowed or blocked by checking
each flow with the rules of all the associated security groups. With both allowed and
blocked flows, we build the flow structure, a directed graph at the VM-level, based
on flows’ src IPs, dst IPs and dst ports. The directed edges are labeled as “allow” or
“block” to differentiate the flows are accepted by rules or not. This VM-level graph
can also be easily converted to a security group level graph by aggregating the flows
of VMs belonging to the same security group. An example of flow structure for tenant
Alice is shown in Fig. 3.4b, where we see that the (dynamic) flow structure is more
“sophisticated”, e.g., containing more “tiers”, than the simple tier-1 structure depicted
in Fig. 3.4a.
Recommender. It utilizes the information generated by the security group structure
and flow structure in order to identify the differences between the rules created and
the flows accepted or denied by customer VMs. It further alters customers about the
mismatch as as well offers suggestions to modify security group by providing the analysis
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Figure 3.4: Examples of SG/VM Structure and Flow Structure.
report3. If the security groups are defined too widely, we can recommend that tenants
refine their security groups to restrict ports and IPs that do not appear in the flow
structure. For example, given most security group and VM structures are complete
graphs, the flow structure can show more sophisticated structures. It also analyzes the
causes of blocked flows. In terms of the “block” edges, if the same kind (same src IP,
dst IP and dst port) of blocked flows keeps coming for a long time, Socrates raises alert
to customers in case of potential misconfigurations or attempt of attacks.
3.5 Security Group Configuration Analysis and Diagnosis
To evaluate the efficacy of the proposed tool, we apply Socrates to examine and analyze
the security group configuration issues of all tenants on our IaaS cloud, using one-week
datasets of tenant security group settings, VM layouts and traffic flows. In the following,
we will first provide a brief overview of the results we have obtained, highlighting a few
configuration issues uncovered by Socrates. Then, we will discuss the structural analysis
of security group configurations to illustrate how Socrates can help tenants visually
3We quantify mismatches using the Jaccard distances of corresponding IP ranges and port ranges
within two structures. While the threshold on Jaccard distances can be set according to management
needs, we choose a conservative value of 0.1 in our experiments. In other words, we only study most
significant mismatches.
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analyze their security group settings and track their changes over time. We will also
present analysis and discussion of the uncovered configuration issues in the end.
3.5.1 A Brief Overview of Results Obtained via Socrates
As alluded earlier, in contrast to firewall rules which tend to be configured by profes-
sional network operators, security groups are often set up by tenants who are “ordinary”
application developers who may not be an expert in network security. Hence we expect
to see many configuration errors. Nonetheless we are surprised to find that around 50%
tenants have at least one security group without any rule configured. A few of them
even have VMs assigned to these empty security groups. As revealed by the flow anal-
ysis, many tenants configure rules loosely, for example, using rules with sources such as
0.0.0.0/0 or 10.0.0.0/8, without regards to the actual application requirements. Other
tenants configure rules verbosely, e.g., by creating one rule per VM (i.e., using a /32 IP
address as the source), which leads to a giant security group with many rules. While
many tenants create multiple security groups for their VMs, a large number of them
do not seem to have a clearly defined structure in mind when creating these security
groups (see Section 3.5.2). Very few leverage (nested) security group names as an ef-
fective way to permit only traffic between VMs of specific security groups and restrict
traffic from other VMs not belonging to these security groups; instead they often resort
to either using overly permissive rules with 10.0.0.0/8 or 10.0.0.0/24 or creating one rule
per VM address as stated earlier. Socrates also reveals many redundant or inconsistent
rules in the security group configurations, likely the result of tenants’ lack of knowledge
about the intricacies of security groups (e.g., rule ordering is immaterial) or mistakes
in configuring rules.
3.5.2 Structural Analysis of Security Group Configurations
Socrates takes the security group settings of each tenant, the VM mapping as well as
the observed traffic flows as inputs, and employs visual analytics to assist cloud tenants
in understanding the static and dynamic access relations among VMs based on the
security groups they have specified and the traffic observed. In this section we report
some key results we have obtained by applying Socrates to all tenants’ security group
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Figure 3.5: Three categories of tenant structures.
settings using the one-week datasets.
The goal of structural analysis of security group configurations is to help tenants
visualize and understand the relations among various security groups they have config-
ured, whether they reflect the roles and application requirements of the VMs associated
with these security groups, and how the observed traffic (both allowed and blocked)
traffic match what the security group rules are intended to accomplish. We find that
although a majority of tenants have more than one security group configured, many do
not appear to have a clearly defined structure in mind. We observe that 51% tenants
tend to have a single-tier, whereas the remaining have two tiers. No tenant has more
than two tiers, despite some of them have configured a large number of rules that apply
to a large number of VMs.
Fig. 3.5 depicts three representative examples of two-tiered security group structures
generated by Socrates, which we classify them as: (i) public customer facing web service,
(ii) private enterprise application, and (iii) back-end service support. The tenants in
category (i) use the IaaS cloud platform to deploy a public web service serving customers
from everywhere (0.0.0.0/0), while the tenants in category (ii) may have likely migrated
a private enterprise application to the IaaS cloud platform and thus restrict it to a
specific set of IP address ranges belonging to the private enterprises. The tenants in
category (iii) on the other hand leverage the the IaaS cloud platform for back-end service
(e.g., databases) support for another service (or tenant). In this case, we often see that
traffic from another tenant (often in category (i)) is allowed. Judging based on the
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names of the tenants involved, the two tenants likely belong to the same owner. In
category (iii), although some traffic from one or two external networks are allowed, they
are primarily for the management purpose (SSH or ping from the external networks).
The remaining rules are all restricted to internal VMs, and the commonly used ports
are for web proxy services, databases services, synchronization services, and monitoring
services. For tenants with two tiers, 61% are public customer facing, 32% tenants are
private enterprise application, and 7% tenant are back-end service support.
The (static) structure of the security group settings is also reflected by the dynamic
structure in the observed traffic flows through the flow analysis. We find that VMs
associated with the tier-1 security groups often function as web servers/web proxies,
load balancers, or jump servers. VMs associated with many tier 2 security groups
are running database services, certain application services or monitoring services. In
particular, we notice that VMs associated with the “monitoring” security groups only
send traffic to other VMs, but hardly allow traffic from other VMs.
Potential Vulnerabilities. As stated earlier, we find that many tenants have a single-
tier structure. Further analysis reveals that for a majority of tenants (70%), their secu-
rity groups form a full mesh, i.e., any pair of security groups are allowed to communicate
with each other. Based on our observation, the existence of many full meshes is caused
by tenants extensively using 10.0.0.0/8 and 10.x.x.x/24 to grant access to their VMs.
In particular, we find that 16% tenants use 10.0.0.0/8, 23% of tenants use 10.x.x.x/24,
and 44% tenants use 10.x.x.x/y where 8 < y < 24. On the other hand, based on the
analysis of observed traffic flows of these tenants, these rules are meant to apply to VMs
belonging to the tenants’ own security groups. These overly permissive rules imply that
any other VMs in the cloud platform (even those not belonging to the tenants) are
allowed to access these VMs, thereby creating potential security vulnerabilities. As a
tenant may not know the private IP address range dynamically assigned to its VMs,
many resort to simply use 10.x.x.x/8 or 10.x.x.x/24 to cover its VMs, as opposed to
use the names of its security groups directly. A particularly concerning problem with
these tenants with such a “full-mesh” single-tier structure is that as some of the VMs
are associated with security groups which are “public customer facing”, i.e., allowing
external traffic to access them. As a result, one compromised customer-facing VM can
lead to other VMs (even though they are not assigned any public IP address, thus
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Figure 3.6: Snapshots of an actively-developing tenant Eric. The number of VMs is
normalized.
not directly addressable from the outside world) being potentially compromised. By
analyzing both the static security group settings and dynamic VM layouts as well as
the observed traffic flows, Socrates is capable of alerting tenants about such potential
security vulnerabilities and suggest alternative security group structures based on the
common traffic patterns observed among VMs.
3.5.3 Tracking Configuration Changes
By applying Socrates to the security group settings, VM layouts and flow datasets over
one week, we also track how tenants modify the security group rules to experiment with
and refine their settings to meet application needs, or adapt to changing application
requirements. By observing what flows are allowed and what are blocked, and how they
vary over a period of one week, we can also get a sense of what are “normal” traffic
activities, but what may be “anomalous” traffic activities.
In our datasets, 14% of the tenants made security groups configuration changes in
the one week period. Some tenants made many changes, such as adding new security
groups, deleting existing security groups. Other tenants made slight modifications to
existing security groups by either adding new rules (e.g., open more ports or allow more
IPs) or deleting existing rules. In addition, some new VMs were launched with newly-
added security groups, while some existing VMs were terminated with removing existing
security groups. We observe that among the tenants which generate most traffic (top
11% tenants), their security group configurations hardly change at all over the one week
period, although the numbers of VMs launched and the amount of flows may vary over
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time. This observation indicates that the services operated by these top tenants are
well-developed and running in a stable mode. In contrast, we find that a few tenants
with quite less traffic frequently changed their security group configurations and VM
association over the one week period, suggesting that they were still developing their
services and were experimenting with the security group settings.
Fig. 3.6 provides an example where a tenant Eric modifies its security groups in the
one week period. Initially (see Fig. 3.6a), the tenant has four security groups and five
VMs. The number beside each security group indicates the number of VMs associated
with it. Note here all VMs are also associated with the default security group. Except
SG3, the other security groups allow external traffic, so that they are in Tier 1. After
half a day (Fig. 3.6b), additional rules are added to SG2 to allow HTTP and HTTPS
traffic from more external IPs. By analyzing the observed flows of this tenant, we see
traffic from these newly-allowed external IP addresses in the same hour as the rules
were added. Several days later (Fig. 3.6c), two new security groups, SG4 and SG5, were
added, with rules allowing traffic from other security groups. Similar to SG3, these two
new security groups function as back-end application services, but with different ports
open. Two new VMs were launched, one associated with SG4 and one with SG5. The
flow datasets reveal that indeed there is traffic between the two VMs.
This example helps illustrate that when a tenant modifies its security group set-
tings, its intention is often to permit or restrict certain traffic. Therefore, the dynamic
structure in the observed flows should also change accordingly. However, we have also
observed that the dynamic flow structures change before the security group configura-
tion is modified. While flow structures change may be due to, e.g., attacks, when such
changes persist over time, they can be an indication of changing application require-
ments or a change in the nature of services. For example, if the same type of flows
continuously get blocked for a long time, this may be due to a “misconfiguration” (a
previously too restrictive rule may need to be relaxed). In this case, our tool will raise
a red flag to notify the tenant.
Potential Vulnerabilities. As tenants add new rules or modify their existing security
group settings over time to meet changing application or service requirements, many
forget to delete their old rules. These lead to redundant or inconsistent rules in the
security group configurations, say, with multiple rules apply to the same or overlapping
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or a subset of IP address blocks which permit traffic on a different set of TCP/UDP
ports. Some of these configuration issues may be due to tenants’ lack of knowledge in
security group configurations: they may not realize that once a rule is set, it cannot
be modified/updated; creating a new rule, say, applies to the same IP prefix block but
with a new port range, does not invalidate the previously configured rule – old rules
must be explicitly deleted when they are no longer needed. Some tenants may simply
forget to delete old rules when creating new rules or forget about the existence of these
old rules. Given that the ordering of rules in a security group does not matter, such
mistakes can potentially create security holes, especially when a new rule is put in place
to limit certain unwanted traffic that an old rule previously allows. Socrates is able
to explicitly flag such redundant or inconsistent rules and alert the tenants about such
configuration issues which potentially create security vulnerabilities.
3.5.4 Loose, Verbose, and Inconsistent Configurations
As mentioned earlier, it is surprising that most tenants (more than 80%) set security
groups in a loose manner. Tenants are suggested to restrict IP ranges to credible IP
blocks by using proper CIDR notation or security group names. In addition, tenants
are encouraged to use nested security groups to specify IP ranges. This feature enables
allowing traffic from all VMs associated with the nested security group without using
individual IPs or IP ranges. If there is any VM newly-launched or stopped, the tenant
does not need to modify the rules. Based on our observation, the flow structure often
time reveals a subset of the access relationship than the security group structure gen-
erated by security group settings. It also tends to reveal more about the tier structure.
One of the key reasons is that tenants extensively set security groups loosely, such as
10.0.0.0/8 and 10.x.x.x/24. Hence, the corresponding security group settings can be
refined to be more restrictive based on the flow structure. In addition to setting rules
loosely, some tenants also set security groups loosely. Specifically, instead of setting
security groups distinctly to present their roles, the tenants simply replicate security
groups over and over again. In this case, these security groups have exactly the same
rules but different security group names. However, by looking into their flow structures,
we clearly see each of these security group’s real intentions and functions are entirely
different. Hence, we suggest the tenant should refine security groups to reflect their
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distinct roles.
In contrast to setting security groups loosely, a few tenants in our cloud set their
security groups in an extremely verbose manner. Especially some tenants only have one
giant security group with hundreds of rules. We observe that it is because the rules are
set by using individual IPs of VMs. If there is any VM launched or stopped, the same
type of rules need to be added or deleted.
Redundant or inconsistent rules are the multiple rules which apply to the same or
a subset of IP address blocks/ports which permit traffic on a different set of ports/IP
address blocks, one a subset of the other. Such rules make little sense, as traffic will
be allowed by the most permissive rule. Among the tenants which have redundant
rules, 30% tenants have more permissive rules followed by more restrictive rules, 40%
tenants have more restrictive rules followed by more permissive rules, and 30% tenants
have both cases. With the analysis of sFlow dataset, in terms of the tenants which
have more permissive rules coming first, 83% tenants have most flows allowed by the
former permissive rule but cannot be allowed by the latter restrictive one. 17% tenants
have most flows allowed by the former permissive rule and could also be allowed by
the restrictive rule. In terms of the tenants which have more restrictive rules coming
first, we find that 75% of them have only a few flows allowed by the former restrictive
rule and most flows accepted by the later permissive rule, which indicates the customer
intends to create a more permissive rule to replace the restrictive one, but unfortunately
forgets to delete the restrictive rule. 25% tenants have most flows allowed by the former
restrictive rule while only a few allowed by the latter permissive rule.
3.6 Summary
The contributions of this chapter are summarized below: i) Using the real-world datasets
from a multi-tenant IaaS cloud, we have conducted a first measurement-based analysis of
security group configuration and usage. Through this measurement-based analysis, we
have studied the common usage patterns in how cloud tenants generally configure their
security groups. We revealed some issues and potential vulnerabilities in cloud tenant
security group configurations. ii) Motivated by the results and insights obtained from
this measurement study, we then proposed and developed a security group analysis
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tool called Socrates. Socrates enables tenants visualize and hence to understand the
static and dynamic access relations among VMs. Socrates also helps diagnose potential
misconfigurations and provides suggestions to refine security group configurations based
on real traffic traversing tenants VMs. iii) We have applied Socrates on all tenants hosted
on the IaaS cloud and demonstrate its effectiveness in helping cloud tenants analyze,
visual, diagnose and refine their security group settings. To the best of our knowledge,
we believe that our work is the first to analyze cloud security group usage based on real-
world datasets, and to develop a tool to help cloud tenants to understand, diagnose and
better refine their security group configurations. Our work sheds light on the common
usage (“good” and “bad” practices) of cloud security groups and on how to design better
and more secure cloud systems and services.
Chapter 4
Unified Fine-Grained Path
Control in Legacy and OpenFlow
Hybrid Networks
4.1 Introduction
With a (logically) centralized control plane [15, 16] and a programmatic match-action
data plane abstraction [17, 18, 19], software-defined networking (SDN) [10, 11, 12] en-
ables flexible, fine-grained network control and monitoring, and offers the potential to
transform network management: from today’s largely manual process to an automated
process governed by (high-level) network policies. Studies show that SDN can reduce
the cost of operating a network by half [21]. Thanks to these benefits, earliest adoption
of SDN occurs in data centers, where size renders manual network management diffi-
cult. SDN has also been applied to wide-area networks (WANs), e.g., those connecting
multiple data centers [33, 34, 35], to more effectively manage expensive bandwidth of
WANs and the edge networks of data centers that interconnected with multiple other
Autonomous Systems (ASes) [36, 37]. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or carrier net-
works have also started considering the adoption of SDN [38].
However, the majority of networks on the Internet are enterprise networks, where
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deployment of SDN faces major challenges. Unlike data center networks with well-
structured topologies, enterprise networks often evolve in a not well-planned, “organic”
fashion as the need for network connectivity and bandwidth grows. As a result, enter-
prise network topologies can be arbitrary—often with many quasi-tree like structures
as access networks and a “semi-mesh” campus core network connecting those access
networks. Further, most enterprise networks [39, 40, 41] comprise layer 2 (L2) Ether-
net switches supporting VLANs and use layer 3 (L3) IP routers as gateways to route
between VLANs or for external Internet connectivity.
Converting enterprise networks to SDN is difficult. First, budget constraints make it
cost-prohibitive [42] to perform a “wholesale” upgrade from a Ethernet-based “legacy”
network to a programmable1 SDN network. In addition, enterprises often run mission-
critical applications that rely on existing legacy hardware devices and/or software com-
ponents. Recent work has proposed partial SDN deployments where only a fraction
of the switches are upgraded to SDN [43, 44, 45, 46, 42]. Operators control the SDN-
enabled devices but cannot affect the paths through the legacy network. Much of the
routing must be coarsely engineered using VLANs or tunnels [44, 46] or left to the
latitude of L2 protocols such as Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) or ECMP. This lim-
its network control as some policies cannot be installed. Most network operators of
enterprise networks have little or no experience in managing and operating new SDN
networks. They need to gradually gain experience and build confidence in running SDN
networks.
In this chapter, we present a novel framework for incremental and graceful transi-
tion of legacy networks comprised primarily of L2 Ethernet switches to SDN-capable
networks. Rather than performing an expensive and disruptive wholesale upgrade or
converting parts of the network into “SDN islands”, we argue and advocate that it is
not only possible but in fact advantageous to migrate a network of legacy switches to a
hybrid network of mixed legacy switches and SDN-capable switches while at the same
time reaping as much benefit as a fully deployed SDN network. The key idea behind
our proposed framework, which we call Magneto, is that by replacing one or a few
strategically placed L2 legacy switches with SDN-capable switches, or by adding SDN
1We interchangeably use the terms programmable, OpenFlow(-enabled), or SDN(-capable) to refer to
devices whose forwarding tables can be configured remotely from a centralized controller.
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switches, we can influence the forwarding behavior of legacy switches and end hosts
(i.e., “magnetize” them). This allows us to gain visibility and exert control over legacy
devices without the need to make any modifications to existing legacy hardware devices
or software components (e.g., configuring VLANs or virtualization).
Magneto employs two key mechanisms to exert SDN-like control over legacy L2
switches: telekinesis where we leverage OpenFlow switches to inject seed packets to
manipulate legacy switches’ forwarding tables; and magnet addresses where we use
gratuitous ARP messages to populate the ARP tables at end hosts with “fictitious” or
“illusory” MAC addresses for the purpose of gaining network visibility and controlling
routing and forwarding behaviors of end hosts and legacy switches. We describe the
baseline telekinesis mechanism without the use of magnet MAC addresses in Section 4.3.
This is the path control mechanism used in our prior work [47] for hybrid networks. This
baseline mechanism injects seed packets with the native MAC address of a destination
host of the path to install. This mechanism suffers from two shortcomings: i) it can
only exert limited, coarse-grained (i.e., per-destination) path control and ii) the path
installed may be unstable. In Section 4.4, we introduce magnet addresses and outline
how they can be used to exert fine-grained (i.e., per source-destination pair) path control
in hybrid networks and formulate the (path) controllability condition. We present the
detailed Magneto fine-grained path control components in Section 4.5.
We evaluate Magneto using simulations on larger enterprise network topology and on
a real-world testbed (Section 5.7). We demonstrate that Magneto is capable of enforcing
complex policies in hybrid networks, e.g., routing along multiple disjoint paths to the
same destination for congestion control or load balancing [48, 49, 50]. Magneto can
install diverse paths with little control and data plane overhead, and exert full control
over routing even when only 20% of the switches are SDN-capable.
In a nutshell, Magneto provides a unified network controller to exert SDN-like con-
trol over both programmable and legacy switches in hybrid networks. It enables network
operators to transition legacy networks to SDN networks in stages by gradually replac-
ing more and more legacy switches with SDN-capable switches as needed and as budgets
allow. Further, it allows network operators to gracefully experiment with SDN net-
works to gain experience and build confidence while eliminating or minimizing service
disruption. Our work demonstrates that it is possible to enjoy much of the benefits of
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Figure 4.1: Path diversity in legacy (left) and hybrid (right) networks: In legacy net-
works, the spanning tree created by STP (solid blue lines) constrains the end-to-end
paths. In hybrid networks, all links that are part of the spanning tree or adjacent to an
OpenFlow switch can be used.
a wholly deployed SDN network but at a fraction of the cost by strategically replacing
only a few (e.g., 20%) legacy switches with SDN-capable switches.
4.2 Background and motivation
We discuss previous work on partial SDN deployment and identify their benefits and
shortcomings. We then introduce our solution for unified network management for
hybrid legacy and OpenFlow networks.
4.2.1 Hybrid Networks
There are several approaches to transition a legacy network to an SDN-capable net-
work [45, 46, 51, 52, 43, 42, 53]. First, vendors can install additional software modules
on legacy switches to make them programmable. ClosedFlow [51] configures legacy
switch features to mimic and support the OpenFlow API and make the switch appear
OpenFlow-enabled to an SDN controller. This approach however requires modification
and installation of additional software modules to process and support OpenFlow APIs;
the solution is vendor-specific and highly depends on the features supported by the
legacy switches.
Another approach is through access edge control via virtualization. For example,
VMWare’s NSX [44] forgoes physical programmable switches altogether and implements
SDN at the edge of the network as part of hypervisors. This approach requires upgrading
and installing new networking software on all end devices in a network. This can be a
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challenging task in most enterprise networks, and may not be feasible in some enterprise
networks where many devices are BYOD (bring your own device).
Third, operators can replace all legacy switches in a subnet with SDN switches
to create SDN islands [54, 43, 45]. The SDN and legacy zones are independent and
managed separately. The benefits of SDN are limited solely to SDN islands and cannot
be extended to legacy networks. In addition, network operators must run multiple
control & management planes, one for legacy networks, and one for each SDN island.
This can add additional burden on network operators and further complicate their
management tasks.
First proposed by Levin et al. [46], a fourth approach is to simply replace a few
(strategically placed) legacy switches with, or introduce a few, new SDN switches in
piecemeal fashion. We refer to such a network of mixed legacy and SDN-capable switches
as a hybrid network. Hybrid networks offer the potential to benefit from the flexibil-
ity and visibility offered by SDN without the considerable initial investment of fully
transitioning to SDN. By replacing legacy switches with SDN-capable switches (e.g.,
OpenFlow switches), we add control entry points into the network to implement more
complex policies and exploit path diversity in the underlying physical network topology
by going beyond the default spanning tree used by legacy switches.
Consider the example topology on the left in Figure 4.1. The paths between every
pair of hosts in the legacy network are constrained by the L2 spanning tree constructed
by STP. This can create congestion on the spanning tree links, while the other links
are not utilized. If we upgrade switch LE2 to an OpenFlow switch to create a hybrid
network (Figure 4.1(right)), we expose alternate paths through the OpenFlow switch.
This allows us to install more diverse policies (e.g., balance traffic across multiple links to
eliminate congestion). Further, the addition of OpenFlow switches provides fine-grained
flow-level visibility (e.g., between two hosts).
Most existing approaches for managing hybrid networks incur significant manage-
ment complexity, as they control legacy and SDN switches via different mechanisms.
For example, Panopticon [46] resorts to VLANs (whereas NVP [44] employs tunnels)
to set up paths through the legacy network, requiring additional (manual) configura-
tions. Further, they do not provide sufficient agility (as VLANs cannot be reconfigured
rapidly [45]) nor diversity (as tunnels cannot select the underlying physical path). In
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summary, while offering the potentials for increased flexibility and visibility at reduced
cost, hybrid networks still face complex management issues. Ideally, we would like an
unified framework to control both legacy and SDN switches that offers flexible forward-
ing control with simple network management and at low operating cost.
4.2.2 Our Solution
We propose Magneto, a network controller framework to incrementally and gracefully
transition a legacy network to an SDN-capable network by strategically placing – or
replacing a few legacy switches with – OpenFlow switches. We use SDN-capable switches
to influence and exert control on the forwarding behavior of legacy switches and end
hosts and to obtain similar network visibility and routing control as in a fully deployed
SDN. This is achieved via two mechanisms: telekinesis where we leverage OpenFlow
switches to inject seed packets to effect changes in legacy switches’ forwarding tables;
and magnet addresses where we employ gratuitous ARP messages to populate the ARP
cache tables at end hosts with “fictitious” or “illusory” MAC addresses for the purpose of
gaining network visibility and controlling forwarding behaviors of end hosts and legacy
switches.
Magneto unifies hybrid network management using a single OpenFlow-based net-
work controller. Unlike previous approaches, Magneto does not need switch-vendor
support or additional modules on legacy switches. Although it does not obviate the
use of VLANs or tunnels, Magneto provides path control and flexibility without the
overhead of configuring VLANs or setting up tunnels.
Conceptually similar to Fibbing [55], Magneto indirectly affects network routing by
injecting fake and harmless information into the network. However, due to the self-
learning switch algorithm, STP and VLANs used by L2 switches, they pose unique and
different challenges from L3 IP distributed routing, and therefore call for different mech-
anisms. Magneto operates at the data link layer by affecting the forwarding behavior of
legacy L2 switches. In contrast, Fibbing [55] aims at introducing a centralized control
over distributed L3 IP routing by injecting carefully crafted “fake” routing messages via
OSPF. Fibbing’s goal is to enhance the flexibility, diversity and reliability of L3 rout-
ing, not to transition legacy enterprise networks to SDN-capable networks, as enterprise
networks comprise primarily legacy switches.
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Figure 4.2: Example of path update: P is the current path, P ′ is the new path; LE1, LE2,
LE3, LE4, LE5 are legacy switches, OF6 and OF7 are OpenFlow switches; (LE1, OF6, LE2)
and (LE4, OF7, LE5) are the subpaths that need to be updated.
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Figure 4.3: Path update between two hosts, S and D, in a hybrid network consisting of
two legacy switches (LE1 and LE2) and one OpenFlow switch (OF3). Switch forward-
ing tables are in blue, host ARP caches are in red. ((a): original network state)
Traffic between S and D flows through path (LE1, LE2); ((b): basic path update)
OF3 injects seed packets to LE1 and LE2, triggering updates in their forwarding tables
and thereby changing the path between S and D to (LE1, OF3, LE2); ((c): enhanced
path update) OF3 injects seed packets with magnet MACs to both legacy switches
and end hosts changing the path to (LE1, OF3, LE2).
4.3 Baseline Telekinesis Mechanism
By replacing a few strategically placed legacy switches with SDN-capable switches, we
are able to, not only directly control the SDN switches, but also configure and influence
the forwarding behavior of legacy switches. This allows us to enhance routing flexibility
and increase network utilization through path diversity. We start by describing the
baseline telekinesis mechanism to control paths through legacy devices, introduced in
our prior work [47]. We then discuss the shortcomings of this baseline (coarse-grained)
path control mechanism. In Section 4.4 and 4.5 we describe an enhanced design for
fine-grained path control which circumvents these shortcomings.
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4.3.1 Basic Idea and Key Mechanisms
Assumptions. In a hybrid network with both legacy switches and programmable
switches such as OpenFlow switches, we can only control the programmable switches via
a central SDN controller, but we cannot directly update the legacy switch forwarding
entries. We assume that each legacy switch runs MAC learning and that the legacy
network is configured, either manually or automatically, to avoid forwarding loops (e.g.,
with STP). We call the collection of legacy links that results after this configuration
the network underlay. The underlay is always a tree or a collection of trees. End hosts
maintain ARP tables to map MAC addresses to IP addresses.
Goal. Given a path (i.e., a sequence of switches) P between two hosts A and
B in a hybrid network and a candidate new path P ′, reconfigure the network so
that all traffic between A and B traverses P ′ 2 or decide that the new path is in-
feasible. This may require updating all switches along the new path. In Figure 4.2,
(LE1, LE2, LE3, LE4, LE5) is the old path P and (LE1, OF6, LE2, LE3, LE4, OF7, LE5)
is the new path P ′.
Seed Packets. The key idea behind telekinesis is to use OpenFlow switches to send
special (“custom-made”) packets–referred to as seed packets–to the legacy switches on
the new path. This relies on the ability of an SDN controller to send PacketOut control
messages to OpenFlow switches and instruct them to send custom-made packets into
the network. The seed packets take advantage of MAC learning to manipulate legacy
switches into updating a single forwarding entry in their routing tables.
Under the baseline telekinesis mechanism, seed packets must satisfy two require-
ments. First, their source MAC address must be the same as the destination MAC of
the path we want to install in the legacy switch. This ensures that only the forwarding
entry corresponding to this MAC address is updated. Second, they must arrive at a
legacy switch on a link that is part of the path we want to install. This ensures that
the affected entry is correctly updated with the next-hop information. For example, if
we want to modify the action of a forwarding entry for MAC m from “send to port p1”
to “send to port p2”, we create a packet whose source address is m and make sure it
2Throughout the chapter, we refer to this process as installing, configuring, enforcing, or updating
P ′.
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arrives at the switch on port p2. The MAC learning algorithm sees the packet arriv-
ing on p2 and assumes its source address m is reachable on p2, therefore updating the
corresponding forwarding entry.
Path Update. Updating the path P between two hosts to a new path P ′ requires
updating all switches on P ′ if the two paths are disjoint. When old and new paths
overlap, we need to update only the switches where the paths diverge. We define an
update subpath as the sequence of adjacent switches that must be updated during a path
change. For example, in Figure 4.2, we must update OpenFlow switches OF6 and OF7
and legacy switches LE1, LE2, LE4, and LE5. Legacy switch LE3 remains unchanged.
The update subpaths are (LE1, OF6, LE2) and (LE4, OF7, LE5).
The above example illustrates that by simply replacing one or a few legacy switches
with OpenFlow switches, we can in fact gain more by leveraging these programmable
switches to effect changes in legacy switches via telekinesis. However, there are limits as
to what path telekinesis may control. This is because the seed packets that telekinesis
uses to remotely manipulate a legacy switch’s forwarding table must arrive at the switch
on a link that is part of the path telekinesis wants to install. This leads to the following
control condition of the baseline telekinesis mechanism.
(Control condition of baseline telekinesis) A path is feasible if (a) every link
on it is part of the L2 underlay or adjacent to an OpenFlow switch, and (b) every update
subpath contains at least one OpenFlow switch.
The first part of the condition ensures that a seed packet reaches the right interface
on a legacy switch so it can trigger a forwarding entry update. The second part of
the condition ensures that there is at least one OpenFlow switch to send a seed packet
to every legacy switch on the update subpath. We will show in Section 4.4 how these
conditions can be further relaxed via Magneto’s enhanced fine-grained path control
mechanisms.
4.3.2 Shortcomings of Baseline Telekinesis
This baseline telekinesis mechanism suffers from two shortcomings: i) it can only exert
limited, coarser-grained (i.e., per-destination) path control and ii) the path installed
may be unstable. We discuss them in more details below.
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Data Rate (Mbps) Update Success
0.1 94%
1 80%
10 59%
100 0%
Table 4.1: Successful path updates using the basic telekinesis mechanism, when we vary the
data plane rate. A path is successfully updated if it becomes stable in less than five seconds
from the time when we send the first seed packet.
Coarse-grained paths. Legacy network L2 routing is destination-based: a desti-
nation MAC is associated with a single interface (and implicitly, path) on each switch.
Legacy network operators create path diversity at increased management cost using
VLANs or ECMP. OpenFlow networks can install more fine-grained paths as they can
match traffic based on both source and destination MACs. Our basic scheme inherits
the limitations of legacy networks: the update of a path triggers updates on all paths
to the same destination. In the example on the right of Figure 4.1, both H1 and H4
send traffic to H3. The legacy switch LE6 will forward all the packets destined to H3
towards OF7, including the packets from H4 to H3, if we change the path between H1
and H3 to (LE1, LE6, OF7, LE5).
Unstable paths. MAC learning reacts to all incoming packets, regardless of
whether they are seed packets or not. A forwarding entry for a MAC address m may
change every time the switch relays a packet from m. This can make even the simplest
path update unstable. To better understand this limitation, we consider a common sce-
nario that can lead to unstable paths: traffic between two hosts flows in both directions,
such as when the hosts use TCP to communicate. Consider the example in Figure 4.2.
If the update from P to P ′ on the direct path is not fast enough, packets on the reverse
path (which is still P) can invalidate the forwarding entry updates and revert them to
the original states corresponding to P. A simple solution to make paths stable when
reverse traffic is present is to continually inject seed packets until forwarding entries
reach a stable state. The frequency of seed packets depends on the rate of data packets.
As long as seed packets arrive faster than data packets, they can override any change
made by reverse path packets and the original direct path will eventually be updated.
We evaluate this scheme in a small real-world testbed, shown in Figure 4.3. We
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set up a simple mesh topology with one OpenFlow switch and two legacy switches.
Each legacy switch is connected to a server. Initially, the default path between servers
traverses only the legacy switches. We continually send TCP traffic between the servers.
At the same time, we update the path to traverse the OpenFlow switch as well. An
update is successful if the path becomes stable in less than five seconds from the first
seed packet. We compute the percentage of successful updates as we vary the data
rate over one hundred runs. Table 4.1 shows the results. The basic update mechanism
success rate decreases as the data plane rate increases and falls to 0 for rates of at least
100 Mbps. In summary, flooding legacy switches with seed packets does not guarantee
a successful path update. In addition, it may generate significant network overhead. In
the next section we present an enhanced path control mechanism that installs stable
paths with almost zero network overhead.
4.4 Magnet MAC Addresses and Fine-Grained Path Con-
trol
We now enhance the baseline telekinesis by integrating it with magnet addresses to
achieve fine-grained (i.e., per source-destination pair) path control. In the following we
first introduce magnet (MAC) addresses and briefly discuss how they can be used to
gain visibility and enforce access control for IP-based applications and services in hybrid
networks. We then outline the key ideas behind Magneto’s fine-grained path control.
The detailed path control processes is described in Section 4.5.
4.4.1 Magnet MAC Addresses & Visibility
Magneto introduces the key notion of magnet (MAC) addresses to influence and ma-
nipulate both end hosts forwarding behaviors as well as those of legacy switches. A
magnet address is a fictitious MAC address that does not correspond to any real host
on the network, but is created by our Magneto controller for the purpose of gaining net-
work visibility and controlling routing & forwarding behaviors of end hosts and legacy
switches. These magnet addresses are the main reason we name our framework Mag-
neto: similar to the magnetism in physics, by manipulating the magnet addresses, we
can dynamically attract end hosts and legacy switches to route and forward packets
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towards OpenFlow switches (paramagnetism), as well as “repulse” routing away from
OpenFlow switches (diamagnetism). We “magnetize” a hybrid network by controlling
the (magnet) MAC address mappings at end hosts via unicast gratuitous ARP messages
generated by the Magneto controller (via OpenFlow switches).
To gain visibility and enforce access control (for unicast IP-based applications), we
can pre-populate hosts ARP cache via gratuitous ARP to eliminate the broadcast ARP
query process. For some “assets” servers that we want to monitor and control the access
all the time, we can pre-populate the IP-MAC address mappings in all hosts on the same
L2 LAN segment with the “assets” servers’ magnet addresses. Since the ARP packet
size is small (though it may vary but is typically less than 80 Bytes), the overhead of
doing this pre-population is negligible. Further, the controller can adjust the mappings
dynamically via new gratuitous ARP messages to alter forwarding paths of host.
4.4.2 Telekinesis with Magnet Addresses
We now present the Magneto’s fine-grained path control mechanism which seamlessly
integrate telekinesis with magnet addresses to achieve fine-grained path control.
When sending seed packets, we set the source address as a magnet MAC address
associated with the path destination, rather than the real (native) MAC address of
the destination host. The seed packet triggers the installation of a forwarding entry
for the magnet MAC address. We also require that the seed packets are ARP packets
and can reach the source host of the path. Thus, the source learns to associate the
destination with its new magnet MAC address. Magneto enhances routing by enabling
multiple paths between source-destination pairs, which enables re-routing a portion of
the traffic on a congested path to a new path instead of the default spanning tree path.
In the baseline mechanism, if one source changes its path to a destination, it will affect
the paths from all other sources too. Magneto uses different magnet MAC addresses
for other source hosts to update legacy switches, hence packets destined to the same
destination from different sources can now traverse different paths. The last OpenFlow
switch on the path rewrites the magnet MAC address to the native MAC address based
on the destination IP address.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the enhanced path control at the granularity of per-source-
destination pair. To install a new path between (LE1, OF3, LE2) between S and D,
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we generate a new magnet MAC address D MAC ′ associated with D and send a seed
(unicast) ARP packet from OF3 to S with the new magnet MAC as the source MAC
address in the Ethernet packet. The sender hardware address (SHA) field of the ARP
message is also set to D’s magnet address, i.e., SHA = D MAC ′. This packet triggers
the addition of a new forwarding entry at switch LE1 and the update of the ARP table
on S to add one entry for D’s magnet MAC address and corresponding incoming port.
The forwarding table of switch LE2 is updated in a similar manner.
By integrating telekinesis with magnet MAC addresses, we are able to exert fine-
grained (per source-destination pair) path control, thereby significantly increasing path
diversity that can be exploited for routing and traffic engineering. As a destination host
can be associated with multiple magnet MAC addresses (for different source hosts),
we can install multiple paths to the same destination host. Compared to the baseline
telekinesis mechanism, this leads to the following relaxed path control conditions:
(Control condition of telekinesis with magnet MAC addresses) A path is
feasible if (a) every link on it is part of the L2 underlay or adjacent to an OpenFlow
switch, and (b) the network contains at least one OpenFlow switch.
The use of magnet MAC addresses also isolates the old path (e.g., the default span-
ning tree path) and the new path between two hosts. This eliminates the unstable
path problem associated with the baseline telekinesis mechanism. We note that packets
traversing along the reverse direction of an old path (e.g., the default spanning tree path
(LE1, LE2) in the bottom example in Figure 4.3) cannot rewrite the forwarding entries
for a new path in the legacy switches, since these packets must contain either the native
MAC address or a different magnet MAC address. In a sense, magnet MAC addresses
achieve a form of network versioning, similar in spirit to the consistent network update
mechanisms for SDNs proposed in [56, 57]. As the native MAC addresses of hosts can
always be learned by broadcasting on the default spanning tree, if we want to revert
a new “off-spanning-tree” path back to the default spanning tree path, Magneto can
generate a seed packet with the native MAC address in gratuitous ARP message (while
the magnet MAC address is used as the source MAC address in Ethernet packet header)
and send it via an OpenFlow switch on the off-spanning-tree path. Using the bottom
example in Figure 4.3, to revert the path back from (LE1, OF3, LE2) (the off-spanning-
tree path) to the default spanning tree path (LE1, LE2), Magneto crafts a seed packet
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Figure 4.4: Three source hosts A, B, and C send traffic to the same destination host D
via different paths.
LE1	
LE2	 LE3	
LE4	
OF6	LE5	
(a)
LE1	
LE2	 LE3	
LE4	
OF6	LE5	
(b)
LE1	
LE2	 LE3	
LE4	
OF6	LE5	
(c)
Figure 4.5: The network topology and underlay affect the diversity of paths enabled by
Magneto. Given a topology with five legacy switches and one OpenFlow switch (a), the
performance of Magneto varies across two possible sets of usable links (b,c) (spanning
tree links plus OpenFlow-adjacent links).
and sends it towards S with SRC MAC = D MAC ′ and SHA = D MAC (the similar
process is applied for D).
4.5 Magneto Path Control Components
In this section we describe the detailed fine-grained path control components employed
by Magneto: path verification, path update, and magnet routing. Given a network
configuration (i.e., forwarding tables on all switches and the network underlay) and
a new path P ′ to install between two hosts attached to the network, Magneto first
checks whether the path is feasible. It then installs the path by sending seed packets
with magnet MACs to every legacy switch on the path. To route each packet to the
destination along the new path, Magneto must rewrite packet headers and eventually
replace the magnet MACs with the real MACs.
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4.5.1 Path Verification and Path Update
Given a path P ′ and the current network configuration, path verification determines
whether P ′ is feasible in the network. For each link in the new path that is not present
in the old path, Magneto verifies whether it is part of the L2 spanning tree or adjacent to
an OpenFlow switch. This ensures that seed packets can install the path. To maintain
an updated view of the spanning tree, Magneto periodically queries port information
from each legacy switch. In addition, Magneto checks that at least one switch on the
new path is OpenFlow-enabled, unless the new path is only in the L2 spanning tree.
This ensures that we can send seed packets.
To install a new path, Magneto generates seed packets and sends them to both
legacy switches and hosts. We describe both actions next.
Generating seed packets. The role of seed packets is to trigger updates to legacy
switch forwarding tables and host ARP caches. Each seed packet is an ARP packet
whose source MAC address in the Ethernet header is a magnet MAC address associated
with the destination of the path. In addition, we set the ARP header to map the magnet
MAC to the destination’s real IP address.
How do we generate magnet MAC addresses? The simplest way is to generate one
magnet MAC address for each path through the network. However, this would create a
large number of magnet MAC addresses and may inflate unnecessarily the size of switch
forwarding tables. We observe that all feasible paths are constructed from the same
set of usable links (i.e., links that are part of the underlay or adjacent to OpenFlow
switches). Further, adjacent legacy switches are controlled by the same seed packet.
We define a magnet subpath as a sequence of adjacent legacy switches on the path
to install. A magnet subpath is part of the L2 network underlay and lies between two
OpenFlow switches or between a host and an OpenFlow switch. All legacy switches
in the same magnet subpath can be updated by the same seed packet from the same
OpenFlow switch. Magnet subpaths are different from update subpaths, defined in
Section 4.3 as sequences of adjacent switches, not necessarily legacy, that must be
updated when installing a new path.
We generate one magnet MAC for each unique magnet subpath. We associate the
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first 42 bits of the address with the OpenFlow switch used to update the magnet sub-
path (e.g., we hash the OpenFlow switch DPID) and the last six bits with the interface3
of the same switch used to send the seed packet that updates the path. This assign-
ment ensures that the maximum number of magnet MACs is at most the sum of the
number of interfaces across all OpenFlow switches in the network. In our experiments,
we generated at most 5,000 different magnet MACs in a network with 100 OpenFlow
switches.
Consider the example in Figure 4.4. The paths between A and D and between B
and D have a common magnet subpath (LE3, LE4). Magneto generates one, rather
than two, magnet MAC address for this subpath. The OpenFlow switch OF7 sends a
seed packet with the magnet MAC to both switches on the subpath.
Sending seed packets. To support forwarding entry updates on legacy switches,
we introduce a new primitive, called LegacyFlowMod. We use LegacyFlowMod to gen-
erate seed packets and send them to the switches we want to update. LegacyFlowMod
relies on OpenFlow’s PacketOut functionality, which allows us to use any OpenFlow
switch we control to send a packet on the data plane. Given a path to update, Lega-
cyFlowMod calls PacketOut for every legacy switch to update. We must be careful to
call PacketOut with respect to an OpenFlow switch that can reach the intended legacy
switch using a link that is on the new path we want to enforce.
Each seed packet must reach all legacy switches in the magnet subpath that precedes
the OpenFlow switch sending the packet. In addition, the seed packet sent by the first
OpenFlow switch on the path must reach the source host, to update its ARP table. In
Figure 4.4, if C wants to reach D through the same path as B’s, Magneto uses OF6 to
send a seed packet to C to updates its ARP cache with the same magnet MAC address
that B uses to reach D. In contrast, if A or B wants to use the default path in the
spanning tree, Magneto uses OF6 to send a seed packet to A or B to update its ARP
cache with the real MAC address of D.
3We assume at most 48 interfaces on a switch; for more interfaces, we can change the bit distribution
between the OpenFlow ID and the interface ID.
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4.5.2 Magnet Routing
Associating magnet MACs with subpaths rather than paths helps reduce the size of
forwarding tables. However, because each magnet subpath of a path is installed us-
ing different magnet MACs, OpenFlow switches between subpaths must rewrite packet
headers.
Given a path to be updated, the source hosts sends packets towards the magnet
MAC associated to the first magnet subpath on the path (assuming a seed packet
already updated the source’s ARP cache). Legacy switches simply forward packets to
the next hop according to their forwarding tables. We insert rules in the OpenFlow
switches that rewrite each packet’s source and destination MAC fields according to the
next magnet subpath along the path to be installed. The final OpenFlow switch rewrites
the destination MAC field with the destination’s real MAC address, as the last magnet
subpath does not have its own magnet MAC.
In the example in Figure 4.4, to set up the both the direct and reverse paths be-
tween B and D, OF6 crafts a seed packet with source MAC address as OF6:2, source
hardware address as OF6:2, source protocol address as D’s IP, and sends it to B through
LE2. Also, OF6 crafts another seed packet with source MAC address as OF6:3, source
hardware address as OF6:3, source protocol address as B’s IP, and send it to D through
LE3. Similarly, OF7 crafts one seed packet with magnet MAC OF7:1 to B and another
seed packet with magnet MAC OF7:2 to D respectively. A packet sent from B to D
starts with source MAC address as B’s real MAC address and destination MAC address
as OF6:2. When it reaches OF6, OF6 rewrites its source MAC address to be OF6:3 and
destination MAC address to be OF7:1. Later, OF7 rewrites the packet header again,
whose source MAC address to be OF7:2 and destination MAC address to be D’s real
MAC address.
4.5.3 Interoperability, Reversibility & Incremental Deployment
We discuss various aspects of deploying Magneto in a real-world enterprise network
environment.
Interaction with STP in Magneto does not require additional configuration on
legacy switches. Magneto adds a rule in every OpenFlow switch to forward BPDU
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messages to the controller, so it can passively listen to all BPDU messages and not
forward them further. This behavior guarantees any interface adjacent to an OpenFlow
link is not blocked, while a loop-free underlay is still formed among legacy switches.
BUM traffic represents L2 broadcast, unknown unicast, and multicast traffic. The
usage of magnet MAC addresses allows Magneto to coexist with broadcast/multicast
traffic assuming that such traffic cannot update the hosts’ ARP tables such as broadcast
ARP messages (which are under the control of Magneto). Unknown unicast traffic (e.g.,
used by non-IP services) with real destination MAC addresses can reach destinations
through the default spanning tree path. On the other hand, unknown unicast traffic
with magnet destination MAC addresses will be routed through OpenFlow switch(es)
and their Ethernet packet headers will be rewritten.
Inter-VLAN Routing and L3 Routers are used in enterprise networks to iso-
late traffic and restrict broadcast domains. Magneto works with existing L3 routing by
either: (1) utilizing OpenFlow switches on the path between source-destination pairs to
rewrite VLAN tags, and therefore it can reduce the traffic latency and the load on the
L3 router, or (2) it breaks the path into segments with one segment for each broadcast
domain if the policy requires that the traffic go through the L3 router. Then, each
segment can be assigned different magnet MAC addresses. Finally, Magneto enables
diverse L2 paths, which can be combined with Fibbing [58, 55] (which enables L3 di-
verse paths) to provide opportunities for joint L2/L3 routing optimization and traffic
engineering.
Path diversity depends on the network underlay (i.e., spanning tree), and the
location of the OpenFlow switch. Consider the topology in Figure 4.5(a) where the
OpenFlow switch is adjacent to four legacy switches. The controllable links change
based on the network underlay. For instance, Figure 4.5(b) shows an examples of all
controllable links (both spanning tree and OpenFlow links) when the spanning tree
is rooted at LE1. Figure 4.5(c) shows another examples when the spanning tree is
rooted at LE4 with less controllable paths. Consequently, the placement of OpenFlow
switches during incremental deployment and configuring the STP is critical in enabling
many paths in the network that can be controlled by Magneto, which we discuss later
in Section 4.6.1.
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Site Source # Switches Max/Avg/Min Degree
Large [41] 1577 65 / 2.15 / 1
Emulated this work 415 17 / 5.94 / 1
Small [60] 16 15 / 4.5 / 3
Table 4.2: We evaluate Magneto on three diverse network topologies, two of them from
large campus networks and one randomly generated. Figure 4.6 shows the node degree
distribution of each topology.
��
����
����
����
����
��
�� �� ��� ��� ���
��
�
������
�������� ����� �����
Figure 4.6: Switch degree distribution for the three evaluated network topologies.
Network failures may affect the functionality of Magneto. Magneto detects data
plane failures by monitoring the TCN and root bridge ID fields in STP BPDU messages
(for legacy links) or port status messages (for OpenFlow links). Once it identifies a
failure, Magneto excludes the failed link from the known topology and recomputes
and updates the flow paths affected by the failure. Because the STP failure recovery
may change the original spanning tree containing the failed link, the newly updated
paths may become unusable once the STP recovery finishes. To avoid frequent path
recomputations, Magneto has the option to exclude the entire spanning tree containing
the failed link, rather than the link itself, from the known topology before recomputing
the affected paths.
If control links fail, the network data plane is still functional, although Magneto may
not be able to update paths. However, existing magnet MACs eventually expire and
the network reverts to a standard L2 network. We are currently exploring how to make
Magneto robust to control network failures [59, 16].
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Figure 4.7: Magneto enables control over a hybrid network with a few OpenFlow
switches. We show the path update success in (a), fraction of usable links in (b),
and fraction of controllable switches in (c) achieved by Magneto as we upgrade more
and more legacy switches to SDN. We assume which switch is updated is a random
decision.
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Figure 4.8: When we upgrade the high degree switches first, Magneto achieves control
at a fraction of the cost incurred when the upgrade strategy is greedy. Only 20% of
OpenFlow switches achieve full routing flexibility.
4.6 Evaluation
We evaluate Magneto from three perspectives. First we show that Magneto provides
high path diversity in various hybrid network topologies, with various OpenFlow place-
ment strategies, even when the number of OpenFlow switches is low. Second, we demon-
strate that path updates are fast and introduce negligible delay to the data traffic.
Finally, we show that the network overhead introduced by Magneto is negligible.
We run Magneto both in simulation and on a small hybrid lab testbed. Our simula-
tions use three topologies: two real-world and one synthetic, randomly generated. Ta-
ble 5.1 describes the topologies and Figure 4.6 shows the degree distribution of switches
in each topology. The “Large” topology represents a large-scale campus network [41]
while the “Small” topology is the backbone network of a large campus [60]. To generate
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Figure 4.9: Control delay (the time to install a path) of Magneto remains low as we vary
the data rate (left) and the number of update subpaths (right) on the path to install.
the “Emulated” topology, we randomly choose the number of switches (between 400
and 600) and the number of links, ensuring the topology is connected. In our exper-
iments, we vary the number and placement strategy of OpenFlow switches in each of
these topologies, thus simulating various SDN transition scenarios.
4.6.1 Path Control
The main goal of Magneto is to provide control over the network without the cost of
making the network fully programmable and at low management cost. We ask how
effective Magneto is in installing paths across various hybrid network topologies. We
run Magneto on each of the three topologies described in Table 5.1, and the degree
distribution of switches is shown in Figure 4.6. For each run, we randomly select two
hosts and compute the five paths with fewest hops between them. We select at random
among them a new path to be installed. This makes the simulation realistic since we
always install good paths.
The number and location of OpenFlow switches play a key role in the performance
of Magneto. We vary the percentage of switches that are OpenFlow and place them
in the network using two strategies: random, where random switches are upgraded to
OpenFlow, and greedy, where switches are upgraded in decreasing order of their degree.
Random OpenFlow switch placement. We upgrade random legacy switches
to OpenFlow switches. We vary the percentage of OpenFlow switches and compute
the fraction of successful path updates. Figure 4.7a shows averages over 100 runs.
A spanning tree is built as the network underlay when there is no OpenFlow switch
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introduced (i.e., the fraction of OpenFlow switches is 0). As expected, as we increase
the number of OpenFlow switches the more paths we can install. This is because it is
more likely that the feasibility condition in Section 4.4 is satisfied: links on the paths
to install are more likely to be adjacent to an OpenFlow switch. Our results show that
with as much as 40% of all switches transitioned to OpenFlow, we can install any path
with a probability of 0.6. Recall that these paths are among the best five between
the pair of end hosts. Other hybrid network controllers, such as Panopticon [46] may
achieve a higher success rate but at the cost of increased management complexity due
to the need to configure VLANs.
The results above are based on several realistic running scenarios and do not capture
the number of total paths we can install. To understand this, we compute the number
of links that Magneto can control. A link we cannot control cannot be part of a new
path. These are the links that are adjacent to an OpenFlow switch or on the network
underlay. Figure 4.7b shows that with less than half of OpenFlow coverage, at least
80% of the links are usable.
Finally, we define the controllable switches as the switches whose forwarding behav-
iors can be manipulated by Magneto. These are the OpenFlow switches and the legacy
switches whose forwarding tables we can modify. Our results in Figure 4.7c show that
even when only 20% of the switches are OpenFlow-enabled, Magneto can control as
many as 75% total switches. The plots show a discrepancy among the different metrics
used to evaluate the “Large” topology. While the path update success and fraction of
usable links are high, the fraction of controllable switches is much lower than for the
other topologies. This is because there are many switches (more than 70%) with degree
1 in the “Large” topology, as shown in Figure 4.6. These switches provide usable links
as part of the spanning tree but are not connected to OpenFlow switches therefore not
controllable.
Greedy OpenFlow switch placement. Strategic OpenFlow placement can im-
prove the degree of control offered by Magneto. We propose to upgrade the most influ-
ential switches first. We rank the importance of switches according to their degree: the
more adjacent links a switch has, the more important it is. Figure 4.8 shows the frac-
tions of successful path updates, usable links, and controllable switches as we vary the
percentage of OpenFlow switches. Greedy OpenFlow placement provides a significant
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Figure 4.10: Packet header rewriting by OpenFlow switches does not affect the data
plane delay. We use one OpenFlow switch and five servers, with each server sending 2
Gbps through the switch and back to itself (left); path installation introduces negligible
delay even at high switch CPU loads (right).
boost in efficiency: we can install any path successfully when only 20% of the switches
are programmable. Because the most connected switches are OpenFlow-enabled, we
do not need to control many legacy switches. As Figure 4.8(c), controlling few legacy
switches (less than 10%) is sufficient.
4.6.2 Control Delay
The control delay is the time it takes to install a new stable path, i.e., the time between
when the controller sends the first seed packet and when the first data packet traverses
the new path without the path reverting to the original.
We perform experiments on a real-world testbed in our lab. The testbed consists of
eight Dell servers, five Cisco Catalyst legacy switches [61], and two iwNetworks Open-
Flow switches [62]. First, we consider a single update subpath and repeatedly vary the
data rate on the path to update. Figure 5.9(a) shows that the control delay remains
low when we increase the data rate. That the control delay decreases as we increase
the data rate is an artifact of our measurement: when the data rate is low, the time
between two consecutive packets is higher therefore our measurement error is higher.
Next, we set the data rate at 1 Mbps and increase the number of subpaths that need
to be updated. For this, we place one OpenFlow switch on every subpath. Recall that
we need to generate and propagate a different magnet MAC for each update subpath.
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Figure 5.9(b) shows the results. The control delay is not significantly affected by the
number of subpaths, as generating and propagating magnet MACs are independent
operations and can be parallelized.
4.6.3 Overhead
We quantify the overhead introduced when running Magneto from two perspectives:
impact on applications and impact on the network.
Data delay. The data delay is the additional delay introduced in the application
traffic due to packet transformations along the path performed by OpenFlow switches,
i.e., rewriting MAC addresses. Recall that, because Magneto uses magnet MACs, Open-
Flow switches must rewrite the source/destination MAC address of every packet travers-
ing a newly installed path.
To measure the data delay, we connect five servers to an iwNetworks OpenFlow
switch as shown in Figure 4.10 (left). Each server has four 1 Gbps Ethernet interfaces,
and we use two interfaces as senders and the other two as receivers. Each server generates
2 Gbps traffic traversing the OpenFlow switch, together all servers generate traffic at
10Gbps (or 15 million packets per sec). Each server sends traffic that returns back to
itself. To measure accurate one-way delay, we use PF RING [63]. We modified the
pfsend and pfcount codes to timestamp every packet before it is sent out and compute
its one-way delay when it is received.
Figure 4.10 (right) shows the delay incurred when rewriting the Ethernet header of
each packet and when simply forwarding the packet both under low and high (99%)
CPU load. Rewriting packet headers introduces negligible data plane delay even at
high CPU load. This matches the findings of an earlier work on application-aware data
processing in SDN [64].
CPU and memory overhead. Injecting seed packets from OpenFlow switches
could increase the CPU and memory overhead on both legacy switches and OpenFlow
switches. We measure the CPU utilization and memory usage on our Cisco legacy
switches and iwNetworks OpenFlow switches, when Magneto controller injects control
packets with magnet MAC addresses.
Our results in Table 5.4 prove that Magneto introduces very little CPU and memory
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Figure 4.11: Magneto alleviates congestion by reconfiguring flows traversing both legacy
and OpenFlow switches. flow 1 and flow 2 start on the same path and compete for its
bandwidth. As soon as Magneto updates the path of flow 2, both flows can use all
available bandwidth.
Number of CPU CPU Mem Mem
magnet MACs (iwNetworks) (Cisco) (iwNetworks) (Cisco)
1,000 4.80% 1.75% 16 KB 8 KB
5,000 6.09% 2.46% 55 KB 35 KB
10,000 7.36% 2.89% 146 KB 78 KB
Table 4.3: CPU and memory load introduced by Magneto on OpenFlow and legacy
switches when the number of magnet MACs varies.
overhead on both legacy and OpenFlow switches. Address Learning in Cisco switches of-
swd and ofprotocol in OpenFlow switches are the main processes affected by the sending
of seed packets. Even with a large number of magnet MAC addresses (10,000), the total
memory overhead increase was only 78 KB on Cisco switch and 146 KB for iwNetworks
switch, a small fraction of the total memory available. We collected the CPU utilization
on the switches every minute immediately after we started injecting seed packets. The
utilization was systematically low, at most 7.36% for iwNetworks switch and 2.89% for
Cisco switch.
Control traffic. Magneto introduces little control traffic into the network. In the
worst case, the number of seed packets needed to update a path must be twice the num-
ber of subpaths. Because forwarding entries in legacy switches expire, Magneto must
repeatedly re-inject the same seed packet. Given a standard timeout of five minutes,
the additional network overhead is still negligible.
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Figure 4.12: In face of the link failure on (LE2, LE4), Magneto switches flow 2 to the
original path (LE1, LE5) to rapidly restore connectivity instead of waiting for STP to
recover. After STP converges, Magneto updates the path of flow 2 again to achieve
maximum throughput.
4.7 Case Study: Better Routing and Failure Recovery
with Magneto
We show how Magneto improves network performance by exploiting routing diversity
and reacting quickly to network failures. We deploy a hybrid testbed consisting of three
servers, five Cisco switches and two iwNetworks OpenFlow switches (Figure 4.11a). STP
runs on the Cisco switches.
Flexible routing. To underline Magneto’s ability to find alternate paths quickly,
we start two flows, from H3 to H2 (flow 1) and from H1 to H2 (flow 2). Both flows
share the link (LE1, LE5) initially, whose capacity we artificially set to 10Mbps. Flow 1
starts five seconds before flow 2 (Figure 4.11a). As soon as flow 2 starts, it will compete
with flow 1 for the entire capacity on the default path. Neither of the flows can benefit
from the entire capacity. After 10 seconds, we use Magneto to update the default path
of flow 2 to (LE1, OF7, LE2, LE4, OF6, LE5). As soon as the update finishes, both
flows can run at full rate as they do not compete with each other. Figure 4.11c shows
the rate of each flow during the experiment.
Quick failure recovery. We now demonstrate how Magneto can recover from
network failures. Consider the end of the previous experiment where flow 1 and flow 2
take non-overlapping paths to their destination. After five seconds, the link (LE2, LE4)
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fails. As STP forms a loop-free underlay among connected legacy switches, no alter-
native path is available for flow 2 until STP recovery finishes. On the other hand,
Magneto can adapt immediately by detecting the propagated STP BPDU frames and
re-routing flow 2 on its original path (LE1, LE5). Although flow 2 competes once again
with flow 1 for the capacity on (LE1, LE5), the end-to-end connectivity is restored.
Magneto detects when STP finishes recovery by sending probes between OF6 and OF7
every second. Once the probe is received on the other end, Magneto knows STP fin-
ishes recovery and redirects flow 2 to the path (LE1, OF7, LE2, LE3, LE4, OF6, LE5).
Relying solely on on STP to recover from the failure disconnects flow 2 during the STP
recovery process, whereas with Magneto, end-to-end connectivity is preserved.
4.8 Summary
We present Magneto, a network controller that enables unified, fine-grained routing
control in hybrid networks. Magneto uses OpenFlow’s ability to send custom-made
packets into the data plane to manipulate legacy switches into updating forwarding
entries for specific MAC addresses. Via magnet addresses, Magneto gains visibility
to the network and allows access control for IP-based applications and services in a
hybrid network. Our evaluation on a lab testbed and simulations on large enterprise
network topologies show that Magneto is able to achieve full control over routing when
only 20% of network switches are programmable and with negligible computation and
latency overhead. Magneto also poses a number of new research questions such as the
strategic placement and number of SDN switches as well as magnet addresses needed
to exert SDN-like control over legacy networks and to what extent such control can be
exercised.
Chapter 5
Gaining Fine-Grained Network
Visibility for On-Demand
Monitoring and Better Policy
Enforcement
5.1 Introduction
Real-time monitoring of network flows is critical to preserve enterprise network health
and detect problems, such as abnormal bandwidth usage [65, 66], inflated paths [67],
QoS violations [68] or security threats [69]. To identify and quickly react to such issues,
operators require network-wide visibility, i.e., the ability to monitor any flow at any
time.
Traditionally, to achieve network-wide visibility, operators follow the routing-then-
monitoring approach: deploy monitoring tools on the data plane, such that they cover
all flows’ paths. Indeed, most switches and routers today support NetFlow or similar
monitoring protocols [24, 23]; intrusion detection systems are inserted at network ingress
points to inspect all external flows [70]. Such on-path monitoring requires strategic, if
not exhaustive, deployment and fine tuning to avoid overloading the data plane [25].
Oﬄoading the monitoring tasks to specialized off-path appliances by mirroring packets,
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Figure 5.1: Flow visibility in legacy (left) and hybrid (right) networks. Legacy switches
are shown in blue, and OpenFlow switches are shown in red. In this example, the
network policy is updated from an old one (i.e., H1→ H4, H2→ H4&H5, H3→ H5)
to a new one (i.e., H1 → H4, H2 → H4, H3 → H4&H5). The green arrow indicates
the path to reach H4 and the orange arrow indicated the path to reach H5. In order to
verify this network policy update, operators need to deploy monitoring software (e.g.,
sFlow) on LE3 and LE4 in legacy networks. In hybrid networks, all the flows can be
visible on OF6.
e.g., using SPAN [71] or TAP [72], may relieve the load on the data plane, but requires
careful coordination to avoid oversubscribing the mirroring ports or paths and may not
be amenable to real-time analysis.
With the goal of making monitoring more flexible and efficient, several efforts pro-
mote a combined routing-and-monitoring approach to network visibility: deploy moni-
toring tools at select locations in the data plane and set up flow paths to traverse these
locations. This approach is enabled by software-defined networking (SDN), which allows
operators to program the data plane remotely. SDN removes the rigidity of traditional
monitoring and allows the flexibility to install forwarding entries that meet both moni-
toring and routing goals [73, 74]. In addition, SDN-enabled switches provide yet another
monitoring device, by supporting counting [75] and inspecting [76] packets, or through
custom monitoring scripts [65]. Unfortunately, SDN-based monitoring requires a signif-
icant upfront investment in deploying or upgrading to SDN-enabled switches [42]. Most
enterprises are reluctant to invest in SDN without a clear understanding of its benefits
and disadvantages.
We propose clairvoyant networks to enable both low-cost and flexible network-wide
flow monitoring. Clairvoyant networks are partially programmable networks that offer
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full control over all paths. Any enterprise network can become clairvoyant by adding at
least one SDN-enabled1 switch and a specialized network controller. In this way, one
can reap the benefits of SDN-based monitoring at a fraction of the deployment cost.
Clairvoyant networks offer SDN-based visibility: they may modify the paths of flows
to redirect them through SDN switches and expose them to SDN-based monitoring tech-
niques [65, 77, 78, 79]. To do this, the Magneto controller incorporates two mechanisms,
telekinesis and magnet MACs, introduced in a previous paper [6], that can update the
forwarding tables of legacy switches from an SDN switch.
Modifying the path of a flow to make it visible is an intrusive policy, which may
not be acceptable for some enterprises, either due to privacy or performance concerns.
To make the case that clairvoyant networks can provide significant advantages to SDN-
based monitoring, we perform a measurement study on their benefits and costs. We
first study the degree of visibility that clairvoyant networks offer (Section 5.3). Using
real-world and synthetic topologies, we show that even a single OpenFlow switch enables
monitoring of any flow with various possible paths to choose from.
We study the performance cost of enabling network-wide visibility (Section 5.4),
by answering the question of how much the performance of the flows and the network
suffers in exchange for visibility. The cost of enabling network-wide visibility is high
when few OpenFlow switches are deployed (paths may be as much as twice longer than
default) but decreases as we add more OpenFlow switches. Thus, clairvoyant networks
give operators a trade-off between the upfront cost to enable SDN-based monitoring
and the performance penalty incurred by enabling such monitoring.
We target clairvoyant networks for SDN-based monitoring carried through SDN
switches. However, it is possible to redirect some flows through legacy monitoring
devices, such as NetFlow-enabled switches [24] or deep packet inspection appliances, as
long as the monitoring device lies on the path between the source or destination of the
flow and an SDN switch. This helps control the trade-off between upfront investment
and network overhead even further. When operators prefer to use traditional monitoring
devices, only up to 10% of all legacy devices need to support monitoring to cover all
flows, as opposed to all in current practices.
1We interchangeably use the terms SDN(-enabled), OpenFlow(-enabled), or programmable to refer
to devices whose forwarding tables can be configured remotely from a centralized controller.
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In the second part of this chapter, inspired by our measurement results, we present
a basic design for clairvoyant networks. We show how to integrate the existing mecha-
nisms of telekinesis and magnet MACs with the visibility tasks to design the Magneto
controller (Section 5.5). With a goal to inform network architects and operators on
the trade-offs of adopting a clairvoyant network, we identify specific key performance
and cost indicators. We then provide a customized design, including a balanced SDN
deployment strategy and a flow scheduling mechanism, that reduces both the upfront
deployment cost and the flow and network overhead to offer a practical solution for
deploying multiple visibility tasks at the same time (Section 5.6).
Clairvoyant networks provide a low-cost flexible monitoring substrate for enterprises
where changing the path of flows is an acceptable policy. They can open up new direc-
tions in flow monitoring by allowing hybrid monitoring applications that take advantage
of the monitoring capabilities of both SDN and legacy devices to build accurate, flexible,
and efficient monitoring.
5.2 Clairvoyant networks
We discuss related research on SDN-based monitoring and introduce the concept of
clairvoyant networks which provide low-cost, flexible, network-wide monitoring to op-
erators.
5.2.1 SDN-based monitoring
A network flow is visible when its path traverses a monitoring device, such as an
NetFlow-enabled switch, a polling-enabled SDN switch, or any dedicated monitoring
or packet capture appliance. Network-wide visibility of all flows is important for many
network management applications such as traffic engineering, access control, anomaly
detection, or heavy hitter detection [80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86].
Traditional flow monitoring achieves visibility by defining static monitoring tasks
that require switch support [24, 23] or dedicated monitoring appliances [72, 87]. For
example, to identify large flows, NetFlow-enabled switches sample packets and build
flow-level packet counters. Monitoring tools must be strategically deployed across the
data plane to enable network-wide visibility, and carefully tuned to avoid overloading
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the data plane [25].
SDN disrupts traditional monitoring practices by providing better control and vis-
ibility over the network. First, SDN allows operators to remotely update switch for-
warding entries on demand, enabling more flexible and dynamic monitoring tasks [65,
88, 89, 90]. Second, SDN-enabled switches double as monitoring devices. They support
flow-based counters to monitor utilization [91, 92, 77, 93] or help inspect traffic to
detect unauthorized access [73, 74] or security threats [76].
An important impediment to SDN-based monitoring has been the significant upfront
investment cost it requires. Upgrading the network to SDN is prohibitive for most
enterprises as it requires replacing most, if not all, legacy switches with SDN-enabled
switches [42]. Recent work proposes hybrid SDN and legacy (or partially programmable)
networks to lower the deployment cost of SDN while providing most of its benefits.
However, with hybrid networks, operators have visibility only over the flows that traverse
the SDN switches and cannot monitor the traffic in the legacy part [43, 45, 46, 42].
5.2.2 Use Cases
Dynamic flow monitoring enables fine-grained on-demand network visibility. It is de-
sirable to have programmable network visibility, if we can program what to see, where
to see, and how to see. Such on-demand visibility provides flexible monitoring capabil-
ities for enterprise networks, given that not all flows need to be monitored all the time
with the same priority. For example, monitoring flows to critical servers is typically
prioritized over monitoring the traffic generated from a student’s laptop.
Network policy verification. Network policies change overtime. When new network
policies get deployed, operators need to verify they are correctly functioning by seeing
(no) traffic from the affected source hosts (or, to the destination hosts). Dynamic flow
monitoring makes it possible for operators to verify the updated network policy has
been enforced successfully at any time anywhere. If any misconfiguration found during
the verification, operators can fix the policies based on the flow record and re-check
until the new policies are correctly deployed. One example is shown in Figure 5.1,
where the updated policy aims to block the traffic from H2 to H5, and allow the traffic
from H3 to H4. Once operators start to deploy the new network policy, they steer the
traffic destined to H4 to OF6 and further check whether being able to see traffic from
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H3 to H4. If yes, the new policy for H3 is successfully updated. Similarly, operators
query statistics from OF6 to see whether traffic exists from H2 to H5. Under correct
configuration, no packet shall be seen from H2 to H5.
Flow performance monitoring. Knowing performance of flows is basis of some routine
network management tasks, such as traffic engineering and troubleshooting. Dynamic
flow monitoring makes it possible for operators to select which flows to monitor in real-
time. Following the same example in Figure 5.1, after the new policy mentioned above
was deployed, operators noticed that the link (LE2, LE3) got congested and complaint
from H1 and H2’s users for slow network. To help further diagnose, operators want
to know fine-grained performance information (e.g., throughput) for each flow to H4,
i.e., (H1, H4), (H2, H4), and (H3, H4). By instructing their traffic to go through OF6,
operators can easily see which each flow’s performance and alleviate the congestion by
either rate limiting or rerouting certain flows.
5.2.3 Proposed idea
In line with previous research [91, 92, 77, 93, 76], we consider a flow to be visible2 when
it traverses an SDN switch. We propose to make all flows visible in a hybrid network
by redirecting them (temporarily) through an SDN switch. In this way, operators could
apply existing SDN-based monitoring mechanisms to monitor all flows, including those
whose default path does not traverse an SDN switch. When monitoring is finished, the
flows would be reverted to their original path. This would dramatically decrease the
cost of deploying and using SDN-based monitoring, as a wholesale [42] upgrade to SDN
is not necessary to enable network-wide visibility.
Towards this goal, we introduce clairvoyant networks: partially programmable net-
works that offer operators the ability to monitor any flow any time. Any enterprise
network can become clairvoyant by deploying at least one SDN-enabled switch and a
specialized controller, which we call the Magneto controller. Clairvoyant networks are
made possible by previous work [6] on using SDN switches to control routing through
legacy devices. As we describe in detail in Section 5.5, we can change the path of any
2Throughout the chapter, a flow is “visible” when it traverses an SDN switch and “invisible” oth-
erwise. In Section 5.3, we discuss how to make a flow visible to legacy monitoring devices rather than
SDN switches.
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flow traversing the legacy network using simple OpenFlow-based mechanisms.
Clairvoyant networks raise several questions about the feasibility and cost of flow
monitoring by changing the path of flows. First, how many flows can we make visible
by updating their paths compared to a simple hybrid networks? While clairvoyant
networks focus on SDN-based monitoring (i.e., a flow is visible when it traverses an
SDN switch), is it possible to redirect flows through traditional monitoring devices
(e.g., NetFlow-enabled switches). Finally, what are the cost and performance trade-offs
involved in changing the path of a flow to make it visible? We explore these questions
through data-driven simulations and real-world deployments in Sections 5.3 and 5.4,
then present a basic design for clairvoyant networks in Section 5.5.
5.3 Flow visibility
Do clairvoyant networks make more flows visible than simple hybrid SDN networks
that have no ability to update legacy paths? In this section, we investigate the extent
to which clairvoyant networks provide visibility both through SDN switches and using
legacy monitoring devices.
We evaluate the feasibility of clairvoyant networks by investigating three questions:
1. what is the degree of visibility that we can introduce compared to a regular net-
work? Recall that a flow is visible if it traverses a monitoring device.
2. what is the performance penalty necessary to make flows visible? Making a flow
visible requires changing its path to traverse a monitoring device.
3. what are the side-effects on the network or other flows?
5.3.1 Methodology
Network topologies. We evaluate the feasibility of clairvoyant networks on three net-
work topologies, described in Table 5.1. The “Large” and “Small” are the real topologies
of a large-scale campus network [41] and of a smaller campus backbone network [60]. We
generate the “Medium” topology to model a medium-size enterprise network. In doing
so, we try to preserve the features observed in the real “Large” topology: more edge
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(a) “Large” topology
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(b) “Medium” topology
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(c) “Small” topology
Figure 5.2: Default visibility, as we vary the number and placement of OpenFlow
switches.
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Figure 5.3: (a) The average number of possible visible paths for flows whose default
paths are not naturally visible, for the “Large” topology; we cut the line for highest-
degree at 20 OpenFlow switches, when the default visibility becomes 1. The distribution
for the number of visible paths for each flow, when we use (b) one OpenFlow switch, or
(c) ten OpenFlow switches.
switches than core switches, and multiple components connected through high-degree
core switches.
Deployment. We consider four placement strategies for SDN-enabled switches:
random anywhere, random edge, random core, and highest-degree. Random strategies
select a legacy switch at random and replace it with an OpenFlow switch. Random
anywhere and random core provide base cases for comparison, while random edge is
intended to model a scenario where operators deploy software switches on edge hypervi-
sors or servers. The highest-degree strategy replaces legacy switches in decreasing order
of their degree and reflects a best case scenario where the most influential switches are
upgraded first.
Network flows. We consider all flows that could be installed in the network, i.e.,
between all pairs of edge switches. We do not take into account the popularity of a pair
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Name Source # Switches/Edge/Core Max/Avg/Min Degree
Large [41] 1577 / 1160 / 417 65 / 2.15 / 1
Medium this work 493 / 355 / 138 19 / 3.11 / 1
Small [60] 16 / 14 / 2 15 / 4.5 / 3
Table 5.1: We use two real-world (“Large” and “Small”) and one synthetic (“Medium”)
network topologies to demonstrate the feasibility of clairvoyant networks.
of switches (e.g., some edge switches connect to more hosts) because it does not affect
the visibility of a flow. We assume a flow is between two different IP addresses, without
taking into account port numbers, to match the granularity provided by the path update
mechanism [6]. Unless otherwise noted, every experiment provides aggregated values
over 100 runs, resetting the switch placement after each run.
Visibility. We define the visibility of a network as the probability that a random
flow in the network is visible, i.e., traversing a monitoring device. The visibility of a
network takes values between 0 and 1. All flows in a network with visibility 1 can be
monitored. For example, a network where all switches and routers support NetFlow
or where all switches are SDN-enabled has visibility 1. We further classify visibility
according to the type of device that provides it. Natural visibility (or simply visibility)
represents the visibility achieved from monitoring flows at SDN-enabled switches, while
supervisibility characterizes a network where flows are monitored at legacy monitoring
devices such as NetFlow-enabled routers or IDSes. We measure both the natural and
supervisibility that a clairvoyant network provides while varying both the number of
OpenFlow switches and their placement strategy.
5.3.2 Natural visibility
Natural visibility describes the ability of a clairvoyant network to make any flow visible
by routing it through an SDN-enabled switch. As the controller can set up any path
through an OpenFlow switch, the natural visibility of any clairvoyant network is 1.
However, part of the natural visibility may not even require setup from the controller:
if the flow’s default path traverses an OpenFlow switch, then it is not necessary to use
the Magneto controller to make it visible. To understand the benefit that clairvoyant
networks provide, we must evaluate how much of their natural visibility is achieved using
the Magneto controller. For this, we compute the default visibility: the probability that
68
any flow is visible initially on its default path.
Figure 5.2 and Table 5.3 show the default visibility of each network, as we vary the
number and placement of OpenFlow switches. When replacing more switches, more
flows are likely to be visible initially, without having their paths updated. The highest-
degree placement performs best. This is because high-degree nodes partition the net-
work in many separate connected components. Most flows are likely to be between
components and therefore must traverse a high-degree node. This result implies that
when upgrading the top highest degree legacy switches to SDN, most flows are visible
by default. However, upgrading the high degree switches is also costlier as they would
need to support more flows and higher throughput.
Although the ability to set up a flow’s path through an OpenFlow switch is impor-
tant, the number of possible paths for a flow is equally critical. Path diversity offers
operators more flexibility in reaching both monitoring and routing goals in path setup.
Figure 5.3a shows the average number of visible paths that exist for flows whose de-
fault paths are not naturally visible, i.e., do not traverse an SDN-enabled switch, in the
“Large” topology (Table 5.3 shows results for all topologies). Replacing the high-degree
switches first increases path diversity and enables more flexible monitoring. Figures 5.3b
and 5.3c zoom in and show the distribution of the number of visible paths for each flow
when we have one and ten OpenFlow switches. Path diversity is significant, regardless of
the switch placement strategy. We assess the performance of these paths in Section 5.4.
Summary: Clairvoyant networks offer full visibility and provide ample path diver-
sity to set up flow paths. Operators should consider upgrading the high degree switches
to SDN to gain more default visibility.
5.3.3 Supervisibility
When upgrading to a clairvoyant network, only a few legacy switches may be replaced
with OpenFlow switches. Although OpenFlow switches provide monitoring capabili-
ties [65, 76], being able to use traditional monitoring devices, such as NetFlow-enabled
legacy switches or intrusion detection systems, may alleviate some of the monitoring
load on OpenFlow switches. While all flows can be set up through a specific OpenFlow
switch, not all flows can be set up through a particular legacy device. In fact, flow
paths can be set up through a legacy device only if the device is on a path between an
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Figure 5.4: (a) The minimum number of legacy monitoring devices needed to achieve
full supervisibility (i.e., all flows traverse at least one legacy monitoring device) for the
“Large” network. The distribution of the minimum number of legacy devices to achieve
full supervisibility for when we use (b) one OpenFlow switch, or (c) ten OpenFlow
switches.
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(a) “Large” topology
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(b) “Medium” topology
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(c) “Small” topology
Figure 5.5: The average flow stretch increase for the top five shortest visible paths when
we have one OpenFlow switch.
OpenFlow switch and the source or destination of a flow. The supervisibility reflects
the ability of a clairvoyant network to set up paths through legacy devices.
We compute the minimum number of legacy monitoring switches necessary to achieve
network-wide supervisibility, i.e., any flow’s path would traverse at least one of these
legacy switches. Figure 5.4a presents the results for the “Large” topology. Interest-
ingly, the highest-degree strategy performs poorly compared to the other strategies:
more monitoring-enabled legacy switches are needed to cover all flows and achieve a
supervisibility of 1. This is because there are more paths through high degree switches
and we need more legacy monitoring devices to cover all of them.
Figures 5.4b and 5.4c offer a closer look at achieving full supervisibility with one
and ten OpenFlow switches. One interesting finding is that when we place OpenFlow
switches at edge, the minimum number of legacy switches needed to cover all flows
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is lowest and the same as the number of OpenFlow switches. The reason is any SDN
switch can redirect all the flows to go through itself and then through one of its adjacent
legacy switches. Of course, placing few switches at the edge may increase the path length
unnecessarily.
To maximize the number of visible flows it sees, a monitoring-enabled legacy switch
should be located as close to an OpenFlow switch as possible. We confirm that all
legacy switches in the experiments from Figures 5.4b and 5.4c are indeed adjacent
to OpenFlow switches. This observation also defines an upper bound on how many
monitoring-enabled legacy switches we need to cover all flows: the total number of
active interfaces on all OpenFlow switches.
Summary: Clairvoyant networks offer full supervisibility through few monitoring-
enabled legacy devices, bounded only by the number of active interfaces on all SDN
switches. Unlike for natural visibility, the high-degree placement performs poorly. Op-
erators should consider the other strategies to gain supervisibility with few legacy mon-
itoring devices.
5.4 The cost of visibility
Setting up flow paths through monitoring devices may introduce performance penalties
to flows and overhead in the network. While monitoring applications may have their own
overhead, here we focus on several key cost indicators related the effect of updating the
path of a flow and whose value depends little, or not at all, on how flows are monitored.
5.4.1 Overhead on flows
How does visibility affect the performance of a flow? We consider only natural
visibility. As we saw in the previous section, supervisibility is closely tied to natural
visibility and flow paths are likely to be similar. We evaluate two flow performance
metrics. The flow stretch represents the relative increase of the number of hops in
the new flow path compared to the default path. It reflects the penalty in end-to-
end latency that a flow would pay for becoming visible. The flow stress captures the
maximum number of other distinct flows with which a flow shares any link. Flow stress
models the change in throughput that a flow may see when it becomes visible, and
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Random anywhere Random edge Random core
L
# OF switches 1 5 20 1 5 20 1 5 20
Default visibility 0.0 0.02 0.08 0.0 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.18
Possible paths 1.4 10.9 44.4 1.0 5.0 20.0 2.9 29.6 110.4
Supervisibility 2.24 9.47 33.77 1.0 5.0 20.0 4.86 17.72 66.33
Flow stretch 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.2
Flow stress increase 21.2 7.6 3.7 21.3 7.5 3.2 20.9 7.7 3.2
Network stress increase 4.4 2.3 1.5 4.4 2.1 1.5 4.3 2.2 1.3
M
# OF switches 1 5 20 1 5 20 1 5 20
Default visibility 0.01 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.55
Possible paths 3.2 16.3 60.6 1.0 5.0 20.0 8.2 42.6 173.2
Supervisibility 2.54 8.18 29.37 2.0 6.0 21.0 3.72 13.62 56.19
Flow stretch 1.9 1.4 1.2 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.1
Flow stress increase 10.1 3.6 1.6 10.5 4.0 1.6 9.3 2.7 1.4
Network stress increase 3.6 1.8 1.2 3.7 1.9 1.1 3.3 1.5 1.0
S
# OF switches 1 5 10 1 5 10 1 - -
Default visibility 0.13 0.59 0.93 0.14 0.6 0.93 0.0 - -
Possible paths 6.7 31.8 41.7 3.3 15.9 30.5 34.1 - -
Supervisibility 1.89 5.9 11.2 2.0 6.0 11.0 1.0 - -
Flow stretch 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.2 - -
Flow stress increase 5.8 1.5 2.2 6.7 2.0 1.5 0.9 - -
Network stress increase 3.2 1.0 1.0 3.5 1.4 1.2 0.5 - -
Table 5.2: Results for visibility and cost metrics for the three topologies. We show the
default visibility, the average number of visible paths for an invisible flow, the minimum
number of monitoring-enabled legacy switches to achieve full supervisibility, the average
flow stretch, and the relative increase in flow and network stress between a flow’s default
and visible paths. For highest-degree strategy, we only present results when we have
one OpenFlow switch, since the default visibility increases significantly with a few more
OpenFlow switches (i.e., higher than 0.85 with five OpenFlow switches). In the small
topology, both the core switches are the highest-degree switches, so their results are the
same.
captures the ability of clairvoyant networks to offer monitoring paths that are lightly
loaded.
We compute the average flow stretch of the top five shortest visible paths for each
flow for all runs. Figure 5.5 shows the detailed results for when we have a single
OpenFlow switch; Table 5.3 shows statistics for more switches. As expected, placing
OpenFlow switches at the edge has the largest performance penalty, since a visible path
may need to stretch to the other side of the network. The results show that with only
2% of switches upgraded to OpenFlow, the average visible path is only 1.3 times greater
than the default path. This means that, even given the choice between several paths, a
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High-degree Every-edge
L
# OF switches 1 25
Default visibility 0.48 0
Possible paths 16.6 2320+
Supervisibility 48.0 25
Flow stretch 1.4 1.2
Flow stress increase 7.7 1.0
Network stress increase 2.1 1.0
M
# OF switches 1 8
Default visibility 0.71 0
Possible paths 19.7 710+
Supervisibility 6.0 8
Flow stretch 1.5 1.2
Flow stress increase 2.7 1.0
Network stress increase 1.1 1.0
S
# OF switches 1 1
Default visibility 0.0 0
Possible paths 34.1 28+
Supervisibility 1.0 1
Flow stretch 1.2 1.5
Flow stress increase 0.9 1.1
Network stress increase 0.5 1.0
Table 5.3: Results for visibility and cost metrics for the three topologies. We show the
default visibility, the average number of visible paths for an invisible flow, the minimum
number of monitoring-enabled legacy switches to achieve full supervisibility, the average
flow stretch, and the relative increase in flow and network stress between a flow’s default
and visible paths. For highest-degree strategy, we only present results when we have
one OpenFlow switch, since the default visibility increases significantly with a few more
OpenFlow switches (i.e., higher than 0.85 with five OpenFlow switches). In the small
topology, both the core switches are the highest-degree switches, so their results are the
same.
monitoring application would still likely select a fairly short visible path for a flow that
is not visible by default.
Table 5.3 presents the average relative flow stress increase when making a flow visible.
As expected, as we add more OpenFlow switches, and thus enable more paths, the flow
stress change is smaller. With only 20 OpenFlow switches, a a flow is likely to increase
its stress as much as 3.7 times in exchange for being monitored.
Summary: Making flows visible has little effect on the number of hops they traverse.
However, it has a significant effect on flow stress as it forces multiple flows through few
monitoring-enabled switches. Increasing the number of such switches helps spread the
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load more evenly.
5.4.2 Overhead on the network
Making flows visible requires changing their paths which in turn may pose an additional
burden on some network links and switches.
How does visibility affect the network links? We define the network stress as
the maximum number of flows that traverse any link in the network. Table 5.3 shows
the relative increase in network stress across various placement strategies. High-degree
strategies do not add much to the network stress when making flows visible, while the
other strategies require more OpenFlow switches to keep the network stress low.
How does visibility affect the network switches? The OpenFlow switches
may see an increased overhead in clairvoyant networks, when compared to simple SDN
networks, as they are queried more frequently by the controller or mirror traffic for
further analysis. We consider three metrics for the cost imposed on switches in clairvoy-
ant networks—memory usage, CPU utilization, and number of forwarding entries—and
study each metric as we increase the number of flows made visible.
First, we measure the CPU utilization and memory usage on an iwNetworks Open-
Flow switch in two scenarios: when the Magneto controller polls the flow statistics every
second and when the switch mirrors traffic (e.g., to the Magneto controller or a dedi-
cate server). Previous research [94] shows that the performance of OpenFlow switches
decreases as the controller polls for statistics. Mirroring packets to the controller, on
the other hand, packs the captured packets as the payload of PacketIn messages [17],
which is done by the switch’s CPU. Though it is also possible to send packets to the
controller as the same to send packets to any destination—output to a specific port by
Number of CPU CPU Mem Mem
flows (Query) (Mirror) (Query) (Mirror)
1 0.05 % 2.26 % 0.22 KB 0.33 KB
10 0.15 % 2.37 % 0.22 KB 0.51 KB
100 1.05 % 5.31 % 0.22 KB 2.12 KB
Table 5.4: CPU and memory load increase on an OpenFlow switch when the number
of flows varies, under two scenarios: when the controller polls the switch for statistics
every second and when the switch mirrors packets to the controller.
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Figure 5.6: Clairvoyant networks require as few as one SDN-enabled switch. The Mag-
neto controller can make the flow (S,D) visible to switch OF2 by setting up the path
S − LE1 − OF2 − LE1 −D and the flow (S, Y ) visible to OF2 by installing the path
S − LE1−OF2− LE3− Y . (X,Y ) is an invisible flow.
the switch hardware, we do not study this approach in this work since it does not involve
the switch’s CPU. Table 5.4 shows the results as we increase the number of concurrent
flows. Clairvoyant networks add little overhead to the SDN switches even with many
flows being monitored at the same time.
The number of forwarding entries required by making flows visible may impact the
performance of switches. For legacy switches, a single additional entry is sufficient to
forward the monitored flows to an OpenFlow switch. The number of forwarding rules
in one SDN switch is bounded by the number of simultaneous flows this switch handles,
since OpenFlow switch needs to rewrite source and destination MAC addresses for every
monitored flow. How to further compress the forwarding rules in SDN switches is out
of scope of this work [95, 96, 97].
5.5 Design
In this section, we present a basic design for clairvoyant networks. As mentioned earlier,
any enterprise network can become clairvoyant by deploying at least one SDN-enabled
switch and a specialized controller—which we call the clairvoyant controller.
The controller consists of two layers: path update and visibility enabler. It receives
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visibility tasks from operators specifying what flows to monitor and, if necessary, up-
dates the paths of the flows to make them visible. For this, it implements Magneto,
a mechanism, first introduced in a previous paper [6] and summarized below, that can
change the path of any flow, even when the flow does not traverse an SDN switch.
The visibility enabling layer reads and schedules enable visibility tasks. How to moni-
tor a flow, i.e., polling specific counters, sampling packets, checking header field values
is a separate process, at the latitude of the operator, and outside the design of the
clairvoyant controller.
5.5.1 Changing paths
Central to clairvoyant networks is Magneto, a framework to change the path of any
network flow in a hybrid SDN network, described in detail in a a previous paper [6].
Magneto can use one or a few strategically placed SDN-enabled switches to influence the
forwarding behavior of legacy switches and end hosts. This allows us to gain visibility
over any network flow without the need of making any modifications to existing legacy
hardware devices or software components. As shown in Figure 5.6, Magneto can make
the flow (S,D) visible to the SDN-enabled switch OF2. We summarize the design and
properties of Magneto below.
Two key mechanisms enable Magneto to exert SDN-like control over legacy switches:
telekinesis and magnet addresses. With telekinesis, OpenFlow switches send special
seed packets to the legacy switches on the new path to be installed. This relies on the
ability of an SDN controller to send PacketOut control messages to OpenFlow switches
and instruct them to send custom-made packets into the network. The seed packets
take advantage of MAC learning to manipulate legacy switches into updating a single
forwarding entry in their routing tables.
Magneto routes using fictitious MAC addresses (called magnet MAC addresses) as-
sociated with end hosts. Magnet MAC addresses are fictitious MAC addresses that do
not correspond to any real host on the network, but are created by Magneto for the
purpose of gaining network visibility and controlling routing & forwarding behaviors of
end hosts and legacy switches. We “magnetize” a hybrid network by controlling the
(magnet) MAC address mappings at end hosts via unicast gratuitous ARP messages
generated by Magneto (via OpenFlow switches). When sending seed packets, we set the
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source MAC address as a magnet MAC address associated with the path destination,
rather than the real (native) MAC address of the destination host. The seed packet
triggers the installation of a forwarding entry for the magnet MAC address. We also
require that the seed packets are ARP packets and can reach the source host of the path.
Thus, the source learns to associate the destination with its new magnet MAC address.
Magneto uses different magnet MAC addresses to set up different paths for delivering
traffic from other source hosts to the same destination. The last OpenFlow switch on
each path rewrites the magnet MAC address to the native MAC address based on the
destination IP address.
Magneto can set up a path through both SDN-enabled switches and strategically
placed traditional monitoring devices. Figure 5.7 demonstrates how Magneto can set
up a path through an SDN switch. To make the flow between S and D visible to
the SDN-enabled switch OF2 (i.e., the purple dashed line in Figure 5.6), we update
its path from the top figure to the bottom figure. To install this new path, Magneto
generates a new magnet MAC address MAGNET. It then crafts a seed packet with
source MAC address as MAGNET and destination MAC address as S’s MAC address
(in the Ethernet header), source hardware address as MAGNET and source protocol
address as D’s IP address (in the ARP header). Magneto uses PacketOut to send this
seed packet from OF2 to S. This packet triggers the addition of a new forwarding
entry in LE1 for the MAGNET MAC address with corresponding incoming port and
the update of the ARP table on S. Another seed packet with MAGNET MAC address
and S’s IP address is sent from OF2 to D, and the ARP table on D is updated in a
similar manner.
5.5.2 Enabling visibility
To make flows visible, we provide a simple language for network operators to create
visibility tasks for the Magneto controller. With a visibility task, the operator simply sets
up a flow to be monitored at a specific location in the network. A visibility task consists
of an action, a monitoring target (what flow(s) to monitor), a monitoring location
(at what device to monitor the flows), and, optionally, a monitoring mirror (where to
mirror the monitored flows). The action specifies whether the controller should add or
delete the task. The monitoring target is a tuple of (source IP, destination IP) and
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Figure 5.7: Path update between two hosts, S and D, in a hybrid network shown in
Figure 5.6. Switch forwarding tables are in blue, host ARP caches are in red. ((a):
original network state) Traffic between S and D flows through path in gray dotted
line; ((b): path update) OF2 injects seed packets with magnet MACs to the legacy
switch; ((c): updated network state) end hosts change the path to (LE1, OF2, LE1).
represents the source and destination of the flow to be monitored. The monitoring
location represents the SDN switch where the flow will be monitored. If operators do
not have a preference for the location, the field can be empty or null. In this case, the
task is assigned to the switch closest to the flow source or destination (if the source is
a wildcard). For example, in Figure 5.6, the visibility task “(S,D) OF2” indicates that
traffic between S and D will be monitored at OF2, “(∗, Y ) NULL” indicates that traffic
to Y can be monitored anywhere. Optionally, the operator can specify a monitoring
mirror to have the monitoring switch mirror the flow to another device.
The Magneto controller takes visibility tasks as input and translate them into seed
packets with magnet MACs that, in turn, generate forwarding rules that change the path
of the flows. Given a visibility task, the controller generates a set of parameters about
the flow and its monitoring location and generates magnet MAC addresses. Setting up
a path using the magnet MACs follows the description in Section 5.5.1. Disabling a
visibility task is similar and it requires the controller to send seed packets that revert
the path of the flow back to default. In Section 5.6, we describe a more complex task
scheduling mechanism, inspired by experimental results, and designed to reduce the cost
of achieving visibility for multiple flows at the same time.
We illustrate these operations using Figure 5.6. When a network operator inputs
“add (S,D) OF2”, the Magneto controller generates a magnet MAC address for S to
reach D, another magnet MAC address for D to reach S. These two magnet MAC
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Figure 5.8: In a clairvoyant network, we can place SDN-enabled switches in every-edge—
connecting each edge legacy switch to one SDN switch. The SDN-enabled switch can
be either a hardware switch or a software switch running on a server. In this example,
SDN-enabled switches are depicted in red and legacy switches are in blue. LE1, LE3,
and LE4 are edge legacy switches, since they connect to end hosts. H1, H2, H3, H4
represent source hosts, and H5, H6 represent destination hosts. Every source host is
sending traffic to every destination host.
addresses can be the same one if OF2 uses the same link to deliver the traffic to S
and D (as shown in Figure 5.7). Together with S and D’s IP addresses and real MAC
addresses, these parameters are used by Magneto to set up the new path between S and
D traversing OF2 as mentioned in Section 5.5.1. Later when the operator inputs “del
(S,D) OF2” to delete this visibility task, the Magneto controller retrieves the related
information and injects seed packets to revert the path to default.
5.6 Case study: edge visibility
In Section 5.5 we presented a general design for clairvoyant networks that can be used
by operators as a basic building block towards deployment. As observed from previous
analysis in Table 5.3, the target flow’s performance can be affected due to the change
of its path. Such change may even affect other flows’ performance since those flows can
compete for available bandwidth if their paths share some links. Can we enable a flow’s
visibility with negligible performance degradation on itself as well as zero-touch effect on
other non-target flows? Here, we consider a specific deployment scenario and associated
79
������
�����
����
��
���
�� ��� ����
���
���
����
�
��
���
�
��
�����
���
��
��
����������������
���������������
��
���
����
�� ��� ����
���
���
����
�
��
���
�
��
�����
���
��
��
����������������
���������������������
Figure 5.9: Visibility delay (the time to make a flow visible) of the Magneto controller
remains low as we vary the data rate. We measure the visibility delay from both the
host side (left) and the controller side (right).
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Figure 5.10: Visibility delay (the time to make a flow visible) of the Magneto controller
remains low as we increase the distance between the OpenFlow switch and the edge
legacy switch. We measure the visibility delay from both the host side (left) and the
controller side (middle). Worst-case flow completion time has negligible increase (right).
design decisions that enable us to reduce the cost of achieving visibility for flows.
SDN switch deployment. To reduce the path stretch of monitored flows, we
propose to introduce a few SDN switches (hardware or software [98]) to connect to
all edge legacy switches (i.e., all legacy switches that connect to end hosts) such that
each edge switch connects to at least one SDN switch. In this way, changing the path
of any flow adds at most two hops (from the edge legacy switch next to the source or
destination to the connected SDN switch and back). Figure 5.8 shows an example with
three edge legacy switches (i.e., LE1, LE3, and LE4) connected to SDN switches. To
make the flow between H1 and H5 visible, the controller redirects it through OF5 or
OF6.
By pushing visibility to the edge of the network, we guarantee that any flow has
negligible performance degradation when made visible. In addition, as the only new link
in the flow’s path is that from its source or destination legacy switch to the adjacent SDN
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switch, the impact of changing the path on the other network flows is zero. However,
when multiple flows are monitored by the same SDN switch, they may compete for
the bandwidth of the link between the SDN switch and its adjacent legacy switch. We
discuss how to alleviate this problem later in this section.
The last column in Table 5.3 shows the cost of this deployment strategy. With 48-
port hardware OpenFlow switches and each port connected to one edge legacy switch,
we need only 2% more OpenFlow switches to cover every edge switch. As expected, the
average flow stretch and stress are smaller than other deployment strategies with the
same number of SDN switches. Flow paths can extend on the average 1.5 times when
made visible, while the competition for the same monitoring device is slightly higher
than on the default path.
Visibility scheduling. When multiple flows are made visible through the same
SDN switch, they will compete for the capacity of the link(s) connecting the SDN
switch to its adjacent legacy switches. We propose a time-based scheduling in which
one or more flows become visible in separate time slots such that the throughput of all
flows in the same slot is lower than the capacity of the shared link.
First, the clairvoyant controller measures the throughput of each competing flow in
a round-robin manner: it makes each flow visible for a small period of time (e.g., 1s) and
polls the counters associated with flow at the end of the visibility period. In Section 5.7,
we show that making a flow visible and reverting it back to its original path is fast and
consumes negligible resources.
Second, the controller combines all visibility tasks with the same monitoring loca-
tions in such a way that the sum of the throughputs of all flows from the same group of
tasks does not exceed the capacity of the shared network link. We use a greedy heuris-
tic to assign groups of tasks to each monitoring link at each monitoring interval. The
visibility tasks in each group are enabled for each interval then disabled then enabled
again until a task is deleted.
We illustrate the visibility scheduling using Figure 5.8, where each link has speed of
1 Gbps. An operator inputs two visibility tasks “add (H1, H5) OF5” (say, flow1) and
“add (H2, H6) OF5” (say, flow2). The Magneto controller first enables the visibility
for flow1 for one second to measure its throughput (say, 500 Mbps) and disables flow1’s
visibility (i.e., reverts its path back to the default). Then the controller enables flow2’s
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Figure 5.11: Visibility delay (the time to install a path) of the Magneto controller
remains low as we introduce high load on the OpenFlow switch’s control plane (i.e.,
saturate CPU usage to be 99%) or data plane (i.e., generate 10 Gbps additional traffic
to go through the OpenFlow switch). We measure the visibility delay from both the
host side (left) and the controller side (middle). Worst-case flow completion time has
negligible increase (right) compared to when there is no additional load.
visibility for another second to measure its throughput (say, 200 Mbps) and disable its
visibility. Since the total throughput of flow1 and flow2 is lower than the link capacity
of (LE1, OF5), they can be combined in the same time slot to be monitored.
5.7 Evaluation
In this section, we first show the Magneto controller can enable a flow’s visibility very
fast while introducing negligible performance degradation. Second, we demonstrate the
Magneto controller is scalable—can handle tens of thousands of simultaneous visibility
tasks on one OpenFlow switch.
We perform the following experiments on a real-world testbed in our lab. The testbed
consists of six Dell servers, five Cisco Catalyst legacy switches [61], and two iwNetworks
OpenFlow switches [62]. Each experiment is conducted for 100 times, unless otherwise
noted.
5.7.1 Visibility delay
We define the visibility delay as the time it takes to make a flow visible, i.e. to update its
path to traverse an SDN switch. We can measure the visibility delay from the controller
or from one of the endpoints of the flow. The controller visibility delay represents the
time between when the controller sends the first seed packet and when it receives the
first mirrored packet. The endpoint visibility delay is the time between when the host
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receives the first seed packet and when it sends the first data packet on the new path.
To measure the visibility delay, we connect two servers and one SDN switch to
different ports of a Cisco legacy switch. We start a flow between the two servers and
vary its data rate. Initially, the flow traverses only the legacy switch, but detours
through the SDN switch once we submit a visibility task for it.
Figure 5.9 (left) shows the visibility delay measured from the end host. It remains
low when we increase the data rate. That the visibility delay decreases as we increase
the data rate is an artifact of our measurement: when the data rate is low, the time
between two consecutive packets is higher therefore our measurement error is higher.
Figure 5.9 (right) shows the visibility delay measured from our Magneto controller. It is
higher than the delay measured from the end host, because it contains (1) the round-trip
time from the controller to the OpenFlow switch where the seed packet is injected, and
(2) the round-trip time from the OpenFlow switch to the host. The first round-trip time
is dominant due to the overhead involved in forwarding a data packet on the control
channel.
Next, we set the data rate at 100 Mbps and increase the number of hops between
the OpenFlow switch and the edge legacy switch. The results in Figure 5.10 show
that the visibility delay is not significantly affected by increasing the distance to the
monitoring SDN switch. Figure 5.10 (right) shows the percentage increase of the flow
completion time compared to the case when the flow is forwarded on the default path.
We send 2,000 MB flows on the default path, one-hop hairpin path, three-hop hairpin
path, and five-hop hairpin path. The result proves that the Magneto controller can
provide visibility of a flow with negligible impact on completion time.
We can keep a flow visible for as little as 0.1ms—the minimum amount of time we
achieved between sending two consecutive seed packets. However, ARP implementations
on end hosts often have protection against ARP trashing, which limits the time between
consecutive updates to the same ARP entry to one second. As a result, in practice, the
smallest amount of time to maintain a flow’s visibility is one second. Even with such a
small visibility window, repeatedly enabling and disabling the visibility of a flow does
not reduce its completion time. We observed only a 0.38% increase for a 10 GB flow
when we enable and disable its visibility every second for 89s.
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Figure 5.12: The Magneto controller can create/update/delete 15,000 individual visi-
bility tasks on one OpenFlow switch in one second.
5.7.2 Scalability
Switch load. We evaluate clairvoyant networks when the OpenFlow switches are
heavily-loaded using the same setup as in Section 5.7.1. To increase the load on the
control plane, we saturate the CPU by adding dummy flows and querying flow statistics.
To saturate the data plane, we introduce background traffic.
Figure 5.11 shows that when we saturate the control plane on the OpenFlow switch
to reach 99% CPU usage, the visibility time measured on the controller increases by
about 100 milliseconds. Yet the visibility time measured from the host is not affected.
In terms of high data plane (DP) load, we introduce 10 Gbps more background traffic
to the OpenFlow switch and observe that the visibility time from both the controller
side or the host side is not affected. The flow completion time changes are negligible
among the cases where there is no additional load, high CPU load, and high data plane
load.
Many visibility tasks. How does the clairvoyant controller perform when opera-
tors submit many simultaneous visibility tasks? We vary the number of visibility tasks
and measure the time it takes the controller to enable them. A visibility task triggers
two seed packets, one to the source host(s) and the other to the destination host(s).
There are no flows running for this experiments; we measure the time for the Magneto
controller to inject seed packets and insert the forwarding rules. Figure 5.12 shows that
the Magneto controller is capable of serving 15,000 individual visibility tasks on one
OpenFlow switch in one second.
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Next, we want to understand what happens when each visibility task updates an
existing flow. For this experiment, we generate 100 flows and submit a visibility task for
each of them. We are unable to generate more than 100 flows due to the limited number
of servers in our testbed. Results in Table 5.4 show that making 100 flows visible at the
same time increases CPU usage by 5.31% and memory usage by 2.12 KB.
5.8 Discussion
Deployment of clairvoyant networks in any enterprise is straightforward. Operators
need to add at least one OpenFlow switch and the clairvoyant controller. To enable
monitoring, one could proactively set up routes among all hosts through monitoring
devices (for network-wide monitoring) or set up paths when flows start (for selective
on-demand monitoring).
Who can use clairvoyant networks? Primarily enterprises that require fine-
grained monitoring of their applications while accepting a little performance degrada-
tion. As they may increase the application latency by rerouting flows through monitor-
ing devices, clairvoyant networks are not suited for enterprises that run latency-sensitive
applications. For such specialized networks, hardware-based solutions installed on the
data plane provide a better benefit/cost trade-off for flow monitoring [67].
Programmable monitoring platforms offer customizable and dynamic moni-
toring by relying on the visibility and control provided by SDN [65, 77]. Clairvoyant
networks open new directions for programmable monitoring by allowing flexible moni-
toring tasks that capture and analyze data from both OpenFlow and legacy devices.
Interoperability. Clairvoyant networks work with STP, VLAN, BUM traffic and
ARP poisoning mitigation technique, as described in detail in previous work. Network
failures may pose a challenge as failed links trigger STP recomputation which in turn
may lead to some paths becoming unusable. Failures in control plane may pause the
Magneto controller to serve visibility tasks but the data plane is still functioning as
usual.
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5.9 Summary
We introduced clairvoyant networks, hybrid SDN networks that offer full control over
all paths. Clairvoyant networks provide a low-cost medium for SDN-based monitoring
by providing mechanisms to update the path of specific flows to make them traverse
SDN switches and thus expose them to SDN-based monitoring techniques.
We studied the feasibility of clairvoyant networks using real-world and emulated
network topologies and showed that, even with a single SDN-enabled switch, operators
can make any flow visible for monitoring by an SDN-enabled switch, albeit by increasing
the average path length by 38%. When clairvoyant networks contain more SDN-enabled
switches (as little as 2% of all switches), their performance improves: most flows can
also be monitored on the legacy data plane with little impact on network performance.
We also provided a basic design for clairvoyant networks by integrating an existing
mechanism for updating path with a novel approach to specify and compile visibility
tasks. Inspired by the feasibility study, we proposed a specific deployment scenario for
clairvoyant networks. By connecting all edge legacy switches to at least one OpenFlow
switch and implementing flow scheduling in the clairvoyant controller, we are able to
significantly reduce the cost of making a flow visible.
Our current work focuses on building a programmable monitoring platform using
clairvoyant networks. We are developing path selection and load balancing algorithms
to improve the performance and reduce the cost of visible paths. We are also exploring
hybrid monitoring applications that use both SDN and legacy monitoring devices to
offer more efficient and accurate flow monitoring.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we summarize our contributions in Section 6.1, discuss open issues and
future directions in Section 6.2, and conclude in Section 6.3.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
Our main contributions in this dissertation are as follows:
Our research in [99, 5] first conducts a measurement-oriented analysis of security
group configuration and usage by customers in a public cloud platform based on real-
world datasets. The goal is to understand what are the usage patterns (“good” and
“bad” practices) in how cloud customers configure their security groups. Motivated
by the results and insights obtained from this measurement study, we develop a cloud
security group analysis system which employs visual analytics to assist cloud customers
in understanding the static and dynamic access relations among VM instances. Fur-
thermore, our system helps cloud customers diagnose potential misconfigurations and
provides suggestions to refine security group configurations. By applying the proposed
system to all existing customers hosted on the public cloud, more than 80% customers
are identified to have improperly configured security groups. Hence, the novel analysis
and diagnose system helps prevent cloud applications from potential security vulnera-
bilities and enhance cloud platform security.
Second, we propose a novel framework [100, 47, 6] for incremental and graceful tran-
sition of legacy networks, which enables operators to transition legacy networks to SDN
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networks in stages by gradually replacing legacy devices with SDN-enabled devices as
needed and as budgets allow. Hence, network operators can gracefully experiment with
SDN networks to gain experience and build confidence while eliminating or minimizing
service disruption. More importantly, operators can enjoy the benefits as fully deployed
SDN networks. we design and build a novel unified network management controller
that exerts SDN-like, fine-grained routing control over both SDN-enabled and legacy
switches in hybrid networks. Our system can install diverse paths with little control
overhead, and exert full control over routing even when only 20% of the switches are
SDN-enabled. Our work successfully demonstrates that it is possible to enjoy the ben-
efits of a wholly deployed SDN network but at a fraction of the cost by strategically
replacing only a few legacy switches with SDN-enabled switches.
Third, with the goal of obtaining fine-grained network visibility as to monitor “who
is talking to whom”,“how much traffic is being sent to a destination, say Google”, we
propose clairvoyant networks [101] to provide visibility for any network flow at any time
and with low cost. Clairvoyant networks are partially programmable—they require as
few as one SDN switch—and rely on a specialized network controller that controls paths
through both the SDN and legacy networks. The clairvoyant controller allows operators
to define what to see, where to see, and how to see; then enables/disables the specified
flows’ visibility in a task scheduler, within milliseconds. Our evaluation on a lab testbed
and through extensive simulations on large enterprise network topologies show that, even
with a single SDN-enabled switch, operators can make any flow visible for monitoring
within milliseconds, albeit at 38% average increase in path length. With as many as 2%
strategically chosen legacy switches replaced with SDN switches, clairvoyant networks
achieve on-demand flow visibility with negligible overhead.
6.2 Open Issues and Future Directions
Network management has always been worthwhile endeavor, and operators used to
drive networks with “manual transmission”. Driven by the rising attention to network
availability, performance, security, resilience and scalability, network management calls
for the upgrade to “auto transmission” or even “self-driving networks”. The works
presented in this thesis focused on building systems to make networks more secure and
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manageable, and raised the following open questions and directions.
6.2.1 System Integration and Deployment
We proposed Socrates, a security group configuration diagnosis system, based on se-
curity group configurations from servers run by an IaaS cloud. Security groups are
currently implemented on the servers that host the associated VMs. The main limita-
tion of such implementation is: the decision of allowing/denying traffic happens in the
end—destination hosts, which occupies additional network bandwidth to route those
traffic to the destination hosts. With the adoption of SDN, one future direction is to
enforce security groups in SDN switches, as close as possible to the source hosts.
Although Magneto focuses primarily on reaping benefits of SDN in a hybrid L2
network, one open question is how it integrates with other network components and
services in real deployment. Generally, enterprise networks consist of L2 switches, L3
routers, middleboxes (e.g., firewalls, NATs), DHCP and DNS servers. Link-state routing
protocols (e.g., OSPF and IS-IS) are widely used in legacy L3 networks. Unfortunately,
these protocols are also relatively inflexible, since they direct all traffic over shortest
paths. Integrating Magneto and Fibbing [55] will provide opportunities to joint L3/L2
routing optimization, VLAN management and traffic engineering.
In Clairvoyant networks, we introduced a software solution to enable network visi-
bility on-demand and proposed to place those visibility enablers in the edge. Though
we focused on introducing a new software solution to enable dynamic network visibility,
one future direction is how to integrate our Clairvoyant framework with legacy moni-
toring solutions such as NetFlow and sFlow in order to make use of different monitoring
techniques to maximize monitoring coverage and benefits.
6.2.2 Automating Network Management
With the rapidly increasing scale, production networks need automated management
systems. Direct human interaction with network devices should be reduced as much as
possible for two main reasons: efficiency—manual configurations are much slower than
automated processes, and correctness—manual configurations are more error-prone than
a program that can handle different cases.
89
Network researchers have made great efforts on the control plane and data plane,
but much less study has been done on the management plane. One inevitable future
direction for network management is: how to automate the network management process
that consists of design, operation, monitoring, and troubleshooting?
6.2.3 Building Self-Running Networks
Beyond automating network management, a more ambitious future direction is to build
self-running networks. A northbound API is provided to network operators to initially
declare network designs (e.g., device connections, subnet arrangement) and high-level
policies (e.g., SLAs, ACLs). Taking the input, the network management system auto-
matically configures network devices, enforces network policies, and monitors network
states and performance.
The runtime of a self-running network should be automatically learning and adapt-
ing. It translates the pre-defined high-level policies into specific control and monitoring
tasks, and deploys these tasks correctly and efficiently. Using data analytic techniques,
a self-running network learns about network states and performance. It then feeds the
learned information into the control operations. As a result, network control bene-
fits from being integrated with network monitoring and measurements, and adapts its
control decision to achieve better network and application performance.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
In summary, this thesis studies the management of enterprise and data center networks
towards better manageability and security. We proposed systems that are capable of:
i) helping operators and users understand and refine security policy configurations;
ii) enhancing routing flexibility to increase network utilization and efficiency; and iii)
enabling on-demand network visibility for better network control.
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